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Abstract: “Moral Particularism” is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral
deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare’s Theory of Universalizability and Ross’s Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy’s theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancys
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting






“There arenoobjective values”,1 claimedMackie once radically and famously,
marking much of the metaethical discussion of the years to come. “There
are no moral principles”, Dancy puts forward, a claim not less ambitious
and contentious.2 While the two philosophers differ in their substantive
theories,3 both have in common the denial of central assumptions of
traditional ethical theory. And like once Mackie, Dancy has become
nowadays a major focus of metaethical discussions. However, the central
question in his theory, the role of principles in ethics, is unsurprisingly an
old one. Although the discussion prior to Dancy uses a different vocabulary
and relies on different arguments, the main conflict can already be found in
Aristotle:
“That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for
it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact,
since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to
1Mackie (1997), 89.
2This is not a literal statement by Dancy, but it fits with his style and content especially
in his earlier and more uncompromising articles about ethics; compare his (1983), 530.
3Mackie’s error-theory rejects objective ethical facts while Dancy defends the superve-
nience of the moral on the natural.
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intuitive reason, for intuitive reason is of the limiting premises,
of which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is
concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not
of scientific knowledge but of perception – not the perception
of qualities peculiar to one sense but perception akin to that
by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a
triangle.“4
Ethics is for Aristotle concerned with “ultimate particular facts” that
have to be approached by practical wisdom, and this excludes scientific
knowledge seeking for general statements.5 For most of modern moral
philosophy, however, general principles have a more prominent place than
perceptual models of moral reasoning. Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics
makes the methodological assumption of his time clear:
“The student of Ethics seeks to attain systematic and precise
general knowledge of what ought to be, and in this sense his
aims and methods may properly be termed “scientific”.”6
This appraisal of general knowledge in ethics for Sidgwick goes together
with a rejection of the importance of moral judgement for ethical theory.7
4Aristotle, NE 1142a23-28.; quoted from Kihlbom (2002), 4.
5This is obviously an oversimplification. My aim is not here to decide on which side
of the battle between particularism and its opponents Aristotle has to be located, but
to demonstrate that the conflict between principles and judgement in ethics has been
subject of discussion since the very beginning of moral philosophy. For more on Aristotle’s
position concerning particularism, see Irwin (2000).
6Sidgwick (1907), 1; quoted from Kihlbom (2002), 3. For more discussion on the
historical roots of the discussion between principled ethics and perceptual models of ethics,
see Kihlbom (2002), 1-11.
7“[T]he same conduct will wear a different moral aspect at one time from that which
it wore at another. [. . . ] The moral perceptions of different minds frequently conflict.
[. . . ] In this way serious doubts are aroused as to the validity of each man’s particular
moral judgements: and we are led to endeavour to set these doubts at rest by appealing to
general rules“, Sidgwick (1907), 100.
6
The attempt to find an underlying structure expressed in a general moral
truth seems to be an attractive way of answering the question of how
we should behave, not only for moral philosophers: the Judeo-Christian
tradition relies on the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule, Islam
settles its codes of behaviour in the Sharia. Socrates tries to define moral
predicates; Plato in the Republic seeks a definition of justice. Medieval
philosophers understand morality as guided by “natural laws”, and in
modern moral philosophy, the discussion between Kantian ethics and
consequentialism can be seen as the search for the right fundamental moral
principle.8
As different as these theories are, they seem all to rely on the fundamental
assumption that an important part of ethics consists in the search for the
right principles or laws.9 And as long the list is of those who – mostly
silently – accept this assumption, as short is the history and number of those
who question it. Sartre famously argued that in each choice we have to
determine who we want to be without reliance on former choices; Pritchard
questioned at some places the role of principles for ethics; McDowell
argued, mainly inspired by Wittgenstein, in a series of articles against the
subsumption of ethics to laws.10 The first to systematically investigate the
role of principles in ethics is Jonathan Dancy. Starting with two articles in
the early 1980’s, he began to question the assumptions on which principles
in ethics are built. Ten years later, Dancy presents the first book-length
defence of particularism, a metaethical position whose main aim is to
show how a non-principled ethics is possible. This book provoked large
8This is not to say that these ethical theories can be reduced to principles. The point is
merely that principles or law-like generalizations play an important role for them. For
these and some more historical examples, see McKeever and Ridge (2006), 4f. and Little
(2000), 278.
9An important exception is however virtue ethics.
10For more on the pre-history of particularism, see Dancy (1983), 531.
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discussions,11 and in 2004, Dancy published a refined position and defence
of his theory, “the culmination of twenty-five years work”.12
It is important for the understanding of Dancy’s project that in his
arguments for particularism, he neither criticises nor defends any concrete
ethical system, but that he questions a presupposition underlying most of
traditional moral philosophy: that it is the task of ethics to find the right
moral principle(s).13 If Dancy were right with his attack, this would, at least
at first sight, raise serious problems for much of ethical theory.
1.2 The structure of the particularist’s argument
and the leading question
Particularism poses a serious challenge for traditional moral philosophy,
and it seems to target a blind spot of many ethical theories. This makes a
closer examination of it a worthwhile object of study. It is therefore the aim
of this thesis to examine Dancy’s attack on principles, to evaluate criticisms
brought forward against him and to judge how successful his attack against
traditional moral theories is. As often in philosophy, a careful analysis
of the definition of the theory, an enquiry into its presuppositions, and a
reconstruction of the steps in the arguments for it might already help to
judge its merits. Therefore, I mostly concentrate on Dancy’s theory and
ignore counter-positions. The leading question of my dissertation is:
What is ethical particularism, is it true and is it a threat to traditional
moral theory?
As it will turn out, the core argument of Dancy’s moral particularism
can be reduced to three main steps:
11An up-to-date bibliography about moral particularism can be found at http://
wwwuser.gwdg.de/∼sophia/schroth/cpartic.pdf (September 2006).
12Dancy (2004), vii.
13The normative theory Dancy seems to prefer is a form of ethical intuitionism. See his
(1991).
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1. The distinction between favourers and enablers. Favourers are those
features that count for doing an action. Reasons are identical with
favourers. Enablers are those features of the context, which have to be
in place in order for the favourer/reason to work. Disablers stop a
favourer/reason from working. Enablers and disablers are therefore
not themselves part of the reason.
2. Holism in the theory of reasons. The context of a situation determines
whether a feature counts in favour or against an action or whether it
plays no role in determining its right- or wrongness, as stated in (1).
Therefore, no feature can be said to have an invariant ethical valence.
3. Moral Particularism. Principles of the form “if x, then y”’, where x is a
non-moral feature and y a moral predicate, presuppose that feature
x invariantly counts in the same direction. Since holism as stated in
(2) shows that it cannot be excluded that x is changed in its ethical
valence by context, neither do moral principles exist nor should we in
our moral thought and judgement rely on them.
Given this way of structuring the argument, (1) implies (2), and (2)
implies (3). Fundamentally, there are two ways of attacking Dancy: either,
(a) the content or the formulation of one of the steps (1)-(3) in the argument
can be criticized or (b) it can be questioned whether (1) implies (2) and (2)
implies (3).14 This determines the topics this dissertation has to address in
order to answer the leading question:15
14Unfortunately, Dancy’s way of presenting the matter makes it not always easy to see
the order of these steps in the argument; e.g., (1) is only fully developed in his (2004).
15As particularism is a theory that has developed over the time, and as certain steps in
the argument have been introduced later than others, my discussion will rather follow
chronologically the different steps of the theory then start systematically with the first step
of the argument and work until the conclusion, the formulation of particularism. Although
Dancy is still trying to improve his theory (see his 2006), I take it that his (2004) presents
apart from minor changes the “definitive statement of particularist ethical theory“ (blurb
of his Ethics without Principles).
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• Chapter 7 investigates the relation between favourers and reasons and
questions the role Dancy assigns to enablers. I try to drive a wedge
between favourers and reasons, and this has an important impact on
holism.
• Chapter 4 discusses how holism should be understood and proposes
a more informative formulation. This is necessary in the face of an
attack that tries to show that holism is compatible with principles and
therefore with the negation of (3).
• Chapter 6 looks into the formulation of particularism; three ways of
defining the theory are distinguished, and I argue that the most recent
of Dancy’s formulations is not the most convincing one.
• Chapter 8 takes particularism and tries to show that still, principles
are possible as long as they are limited to thick ethical concepts. This
helps to decide whether Dancy’s theory is radical enough to attack
traditional ethical theories. Another critical point concerning the
force of his argument is discussed in Chapter 5: what counts for
the particularist as a principle? I think that his conditions are too
strong, and it therefore becomes an option for his opponents to bypass
Dancy’s attack by using a weaker notion of principles.
In the remainder of this introduction, I will summarize in some more
detail these points in the order in which they appear in this dissertation.
1.3 Overview of Chapters 2-8
I start with an examination of two theories that are built on principles;
Dancy takes them to display the general problems involvedwith generalism,
the denial of particularism.
Chapter 2 discussesHare’s thesis of universability: a person is committed
to the same ethical judgement in all relevantly similar situations. It can
10
however be objected that in some relevantly similar situations, new features
might appear and require a different judgement than in the original case.
Hare could reply that “relevantly similar situations” are such that they take
already into account all features that might affect how the original situation
has to be judged. This move, Dancy points out, does not help: only a
situation similar in all aspects is guaranteed to require the same judgement.
But if similarity is understood in such a broad way, no principles can follow
from it, since it cannot be discriminated between relevant from irrelevant
properties. The principle would not only be enormously complex, but as
well uninformative. Hence, the reason why Hare fails is that his theory is
unable to account for the context-sensitivity of our judgements.
Ross, discussed in Chapter 3, does a better job: he allows that due to the
complexities of everyday-life, there cannot be any rule which determines
that everywhere, a consideration has the same weight. What is relevant for
our decisions depends irreducibly on the situation. Although the degree of
importance of a consideration can vary, there is a list of prima facie duties,
like that we should promote justice or keep promises, that always count in
the same direction. How important justice is in a certain circumstance cannot
be predicted, but it can be said that it always counts in favour of the action.
Dancy objects that although Ross is closer to the particularist, his remaining
generalist elements cause him trouble. We can find counter-examples where
allegedly invariant prima facie duties do not count in the same direction
as they normally do. There is no reason to exclude the possibility that e.g.
sometimes, there is even a reason against keeping an immoral promise.
Hence, prima facie duties cannot be said to form principles; context can
always interfere with them.
Some generalists have questioned this line of thought by arguing that
holism, the thesis of the context-sensitivity of reasons, is not incompatible
with principles. In Chapter 4, I discuss their arguments. Holism is a reaction
to certain phenomena where reasons we previously thought to be invariant
turned out to be variant after all. We can never be sure that we know
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all conditions under which a reason might be affected – this is however
necessary when we want to formulate principles, because they must be, at
least in Dancy’s sense, exceptionless. Therefore, it can be shown that holism
is incompatible with principles.
While Chapter 2-4 deal with theories defending generalism, Chapter
5 and 6 discuss the formulation of Dancy’s own theory. In Chapter 5, I
investigate how Dancy understands the notion of “principle”. There are
various conditions that have to be fulfilled for a generalization to count
as a principle, and I especially investigate two of them: principles must at
the same time explain why something is the case, and they must be able
to guide the agent. Sometimes, this explanation might however be very
complicated since principles have to explain the status of every action. In
this case, it can be difficult for them to guide us, because we need short and
usable formulations that help us to decide quickly. I conclude that there is
no easy way to reconcile both conditions and that there remains a tension
in Dancy’s definition.
Particularism as a theory has developed mainly over the last 25 years.
In Chapter 6, I give a survey about its main stages, and I distinguish three
versions of the theory that have been held over time. Extreme particularism
argues that principles neither exist nor that our moral judgement relies
on any generalizations. Strong particularism slightly weakens this claim
by allowing that at least some generalizations might be helpful for moral
practice. Weak particularism goes beyond its predecessors as it only
claims that moral judgement should not depend on principles (and not that
principles do not exist) and that some invariant reasons should be allowed
for. I first discuss whether invariant reasons are compatible with holism,
and I reach a negative conclusion. Then I argue that weak particularism
fails to offer a coherent definition of its claims. For this and other reasons,
I reject weak particularism, and in order to decide whether strong or
extreme particularism should be taken as the most plausible theory, I
discuss whether generalizations should play a role in moral judgement
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or not. Not surprisingly, an enquiry of our moral practice reveals that
we use generalizations, and that leaves strong particularism as the best
formulation.
Part 3makes the attempt to evaluateDancy’s theory. Strongparticularism
is only a coherent theory insofar as the presuppositions on which the form
of holism that support it is built are justified. It is the task of Chapter 7
to examine them. Holism in the theory of reasons relies on a distinction
between favourers and enablers. Favourers are those features that count in
favour of an action, while the presence of enablers is a necessary condition
for the favourer to work. Reasons are identical with favourers. I think that
this is wrong: if enablers are necessary for a favourer to do its job, they
must be part of the reason as well. I propose a that the concept of “reason”
plays a different role than in Dancy’s theory, and I argue that holism is only
plausible as a theory about how favourers behave. This has consequences
for the form of particularism that holism implies; it is only able to support
an epistemic and not a metaphysical claim.
Chapter 8 attacks particularism from a different angle. Even if granted
that principles linking non-moral and moral properties should play no
role for our moral judgements, there might be principles between ethical
concepts. Again, I turn to Ross’s prima facie duties and argue that if they
are understood as thick ethical concepts, they behave invariantly. Holism
cannot be used to attack these principles – e.g. “It is always good to do
what promotes justice”– since thick ethical concepts always contain an
evaluative component that necessarily links to the same thin ethical concept
like good or bad. If this is true, then there is at least one way in which








Hare’s theory of universalizability
The task of the first two chapters is to present two theories in opposition
to which Dancy develops his theory. I will begin by giving a rough idea
of particularism in order to help to understand why Dancy has chosen
Hare and Ross as his opponents. In his most recent contribution to the
discussion, Dancy defines particularism as the thought that “the possibility
of moral thought and judgement does not depend on the provision of a
suitable supply of moral principles”.1 According to generalism, the position
Dancy wants to defeat, principles are taken as a necessary assumption for
moral deliberation. The quarrel is not whether no moral discussion at all is
possible without principles (as it is as well possible “to type an entire novel
with your elbows or [to] drive fromMexico to Alaska in reverse gear”2), but
whether principles are necessary for well-done moral thought. In support
of his claim, the particularist quotes a holistic conception of reason which
consists in the idea that “a feature that is a reason in one case may be no
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another”.3 The generalist, as Dancy
conceives him, holds to the opposite atomist assumption that “a feature that
1Dancy (2004), 7 and 73.
2This nice illustration is borrowed from Chappell (2005).
3Dancy (2004), 7.
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is a reason in one case must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in
any other”.4 I start my discussion with Hare’s theory of universalizability.
2.1 The formulation of
Hare’s universability-thesis
Richard Hare’s moral philosophy can be interpreted as an instance of
generalism.5 According to him, a moral judgement is universalizable in the
sense that
“a person who makes a moral judgement is committed to
making the same judgement of any relevantly similar situation.
A situation is relevantly similar to the first if it shares with the
first all the properties that were the person’s reasons for his
original judgement.”6
Hence, Hare argues that
(U) If x judges an action a to be right, and x takes the features
F1-Fn to be his reasons, then any situation which is identical
in regard to features F1-Fn is relevantly similar to action a and
must be judged by x in the same way.
This thesis can be refuted since in another relevantly similar situation, a
new feature Fn+1might be present in the second case and defeat the original
judgement. This additional feature must not count itself as a reason, but
be among the conditions required for accepting other features as reasons.
In Dancy’s example, a man knocks a woman down with his car, but takes
her into a hospital, pays a decent compensation and makes sure that she
is in good treatment.7 These are attempts to compensate for the damage
4Dancy (2004), 7.
5Since it is here my primary aim to present Dancy’s theory, I shall not question whether
this interpretation of Hare is the best one.
6Dancy (1993), 80; see Hare (1963), 11.
7See Dancy (1993), 80f.
16
and pain he caused, and we might approve of his behaviour. In a second
case, the man acts in the same way, but with the intention of seducing away
the woman from her husband. This additional feature of the situation will
probably defeat our judgement. The problem for Hare is that the fact that
the first person had no such intention is not among the reasons for our first
judgement.8 Otherwise, there would be an indefinite number of reasons
in favour of the judgement, like the fact that the man did not have the
intention to rob her, that he was not paid by the hospital for delivering new
patients etc.
A defender of Hare’s position might in reply broaden his notion of
“relevant similarity” which has to hold between the two situations so that
the formulation includes not only features that count in favour or against
the action but as well those features whose presence or absence affects the
judgement:
(U’) If x judges an action a to be right, and x takes the features
F1-Fn to be his reasons and the features Fn+1-Fn+x to be the
features whose presence or absence might affect the counting of
features F1-Fn as reasons, then any situation which is identical
in regard to features F1-Fn and Fn+1-Fn+x is relevantly similar
to action a and must be judged by x in the same way.
This apparent solution creates however another problem. To understand
this dilemma with the two formulations of Hare’s universalizability thesis,
it is helpful to step back and to distinguish two ways of relating properties.
2.2 Resultance
The first type of relationship is resultance. It is expressed through phrases like
“the property a exists in virtue of or because of property b”. For example, the
8The distinction introduced here between will be analysed in terms of defeater/enabler
and favourer in Chapter 7.3.
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property of squareness exists in virtue of other geometrical properties like
right-angledness, or a dangerous cliff is dangerous because of its steepness
or slipperiness.9 Resultance picks certain properties out and takes them as
relevant for the explanation of another (higher order) property. As the given
examples show, there are two types of resultance. In the case of squareness,
the relation is necessary and could not be established by means of other
properties. The dangerousness of the cliff however could result in different
ways from underlying properties.
Moral predicates like “right” or “wrong” can be explained by applying
the relation of resultance: an act is wrong in virtue of being a lie or right
because of the pleasure it causes. These moral predicates fall into the second
category of resultance since there are obviously many ways in which an
action can turn out right or wrong.
It is important to notice that a resultant property, i.e. a property which
exists in virtue of some underlying properties, can itself be the resultance
base of another higher-order property. The humid ground and the flat stones
which cover the cliff’s surface for example are the base of its slipperiness,
while the slipperiness togetherwith the darkness result in the dangerousness
of the cliff. Equally in the moral case, the action’s being right might have as
its resultance base its kindness and truthfulness which in itself are grounded
in further concrete features of the situation. This structure which has no
apparent stopping-point Dancy calls “resultance tree”.10 Since the resultance
tree is built of the very concrete features of the situation, it is restricted to
the present case; in a different case, the tree would involve different features
that would be quoted to explain the resultance properties.
The function of resultance is to explain, and therefore, the resultance
tree includes only those features which are epistemically relevant for a
sound explanation and hence omits other features that are not necessary for
9These examples are adapted from Dancy’s discussion of resultance in his (1993), 73-77.
10See Dancy (1993), 74. Although I think that the metaphor of a resultance root catches
better the phenomenon, I will stick to Dancy’s picture.
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its understanding.11 Although Dancy does not state this point explicitly,
this seems to be the only option. The fact that resultance quotes a limited
number of features raises automatically the question of a selection-criterion,
and the fact that resultance is – as we will see – the concept employed by
the first formulation of the universability-thesis that picks out only relevant
features indicates that this criteria is epistemic usefulness. Its content
depends therefore on the specific context and on the knowledge of those
to whom the explanation is addressed.12 A resultance tree r is determined
by the situation a and the epistemic situation of the person b at which it is
addressed.13 Hence, each situation has its own resultance tree.14
Could the resultance-relation be used to establish moral principles? The
idea would be that action a is wrong because of its cruelty and its selfishness.
As all situations which contain these features offer the same reasons, every
action that displays cruelness and selfishness is wrong, and this can be
taken as a moral principle. Is this inference warranted? Dancy offers two
arguments against this reasoning. The first is that each such principle is
only valid for this very situation since “each wrong action is wrong in its
own way, and our principles, if we expect to reach them by this route, will
11The resultance base of the dangerousness of the cliffmight look very different when
we address it to a beach ranger, a casual visitor or a Martian. This “picking out” of
relevant factors seems to me to be crucial for the concept of resultance. The purpose of the
resultance-relation is not to state how things are, but how we perceive them – at least in the
case of the dangerousness of the cliff or the wrongness of an action.
12This means that one and the same situation might have several resultance trees. For
example, to explain why a certain performance of a piece of music is beautiful, we would
quote different features in our explanation to a child or to a competent music lover.
13Dancy interprets resultance not as an epistemic relation, but rather as metaphysical; he
speaks of the “metaphysics of resultance” (Dancy (1993), 74). This point, as I hope to show,
becomes important in my critical discussion of Dancy in Chapter 7: he cannot use this
epistemic relation in order to argue for a metaphysical thesis.
14Or, only two situations which are exactly identical would have the same resultance
tree, but this is for Dancy’s purposes, the refutation of Hare’s universality-thesis, not
relevant. Note that this understanding of resultance only applies to the second kind of
resultance; for example in the case of squareness, the explanation is always the same.
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just be a list of the cases we have so far encountered”.15 But the defender of
principles does not need to claim that the whole resultance-tree is identical,
as Dancy’s attack supposes. If this were the case, the principle would be:
If x judges action a to be right or wrong, and rightness and
wrongness are taken to be the highest order resultance properties,
then all actions which contain all elements of the resultance tree
require that x judges them in the same way in their highest order
resultance property.
The defender of principles however might want to “cut” the resultance
tree and say that all features below a certain level are not taken into
consideration. For example, it does not matter what resultance base the
instances of cruelty and selfishness possess in order to form themselves the
resultance base for the wrongness of an action.
Different situations could instantiate cruelty and wrongness in different
ways, and the principle that cruel actions are wrong would apply to all
of them because it ignores on which properties the cruelty is based.16This
principle would therefore apply to a wider range of cases than the principles
implied by Dancy’s attack and could be formulated as:
If x judges action a to be right or wrong, and rightness and
wrongness are taken to be the highest order resultance properties,
then all actions which contain the properties from which the
highest order resultance properties directly result require that x
judges them in the same way in their highest order resultance
property.
Hence, if the defender of Hare’s notion of universalizability refers only
to the “top” of the resultance tree and allows for variations in the levels
15Dancy (1993), 76f.
16McNaughton and Rawling try to build principles out of these ’cut’ resultance-trees,
which they understand as thick ethical concepts; see Chapter 8.
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below, she is able to bypass Dancy’s criticism which is only levelled against
those who use the whole tree in generating principles.
It is rather Dancy’s second argument which is doing the work: If x judges
action a to be wrong in virtue of its resultance base z, another situation
might also have resultance base z but not be wrong. The reason is that a
new property might be present in the second case and “turn the tables”.
The absence of this new property must not have been part of the resultance
base in the first case: “The action’s not having a property strong enough to
make it right is not a property in virtue of which it is wrong, though it is
something required of it if it is to be wrong.”17 As a familiar example, take
lying. Normally, I judge an action which involves lying to be wrong because
it prejudices the institution of promise and the exchange of information.
If however a strengthened version of the patriot act in the U.S. is passed
and a police officer wants to be informed about the whereabouts of one’s
activist daughter, the circumstances might allow for or even require a lie.18
The absence of the fact that no strengthened version of the patriot act is in
force is however not among the reasons of why lying is wrong.
It might be replied that it is not clear that the distinction Dancy is
applying here – between features of the situation which favour or disfavour a
certain action (“a property in virtue of which it is wrong“) and between
features which enable a favourer or a disfavourer to work (“The action’s
not having a property strong enough to make it right“ - the distinction
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7) – falls neatly together with those
considerations we quote “in virtue of” or “because of which” an action
is right and those which are background conditions, hence with what is
part of the resultance base and what is not. For example, it was my duty to
help the old blind lady over the crowded street because (a) she needed help
and (b) my eyesight is far better than hers and (c) I had no more pressing
17Dancy (1993), 77.
18This version of the example is taken from Lance and Little (unpublished).
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appointment. Although one might argue that (a)-(c) play different roles,19 it
is perfectly suitable to quote all of these considerations in order to explain
my duty. Dancy would have to define “resultance” more closely in order
to make sure that no enablers can be part of the resultance base. Hence,
sometimes, considerations of why an action is not right might be part of the
resultance base of why it is wrong.20 But even if sometimes, the absence of
considerations which would count in favour of an action are part of the
resultance base when the aim is to explain why the action is wrong, it is
right that not all of those considerations are part of the resultance base.
Otherwise, the resultance base would become indefinitely long.21 If we
take it that the resultance base is used to explain a resultant property and to
single out those properties which can be quoted in support of the resultant
property, it is clear that only a very limited range of properties can be part
of the resultance base, or otherwise it will become epistemically useless.
I suggest therefore that what is part of the resultance-base must not be
limited to favourers, but to those considerations that help in explaining the
resultant property and that might include enablers as well. Dancy could
allow for both ways of interpreting resultance without putting in danger
his critique against principles. Given this limited range of considerations, it
is always possible that a new situation shares all of these properties, but
contains as well properties which were not part of the first situation. These
new properties might justify a different judgement than in the first case and
falsify the principle that these properties present in the first case always call
for the same judgement. Therefore, Dancy’s second critique against the
attempt to obtain principles from resultance is successful.
19As Dancy does; see his (2004), 38-52. (a) would in Dancy’s terminology be a favourer,
(b) an enabler and (c) the absence of a disabler.
20E.g. sometimes, it would be wrong to cause pleasure because this is not the kind of
pleasure which is healthy for a person, for example in the case of sadistic pleasure.
21Later on in Chapter 7.4., I propose a different conception of reasons which includes




The second type of relationship is supervenience. It means that
“two actions that share all their non-moral properties to the
same degree must share all their moral properties to the same
degree, and [. . . ] no object can change its moral properties
without changing its non-moral properties”.22
If the supervenience of the moral on the natural can be shown to imply
principles, the particularist faces a difficult choice: in order to hold his
position, he has either to deny supervenience which would be a high price
to pay since then, he has the difficult task of explaining the relation between
the natural and the moral in a different way, or he needs to deny that
principles follow from supervenience. But what would the universalist’s
argument in favour of principles look like?
If supervenience is true, then if action a is wrong in situation
x, action a is wrong in every situation that contains exactly the
same natural properties as situation x. Hence, supervenience
implies valid moral principles.
In order to attack the argument, the particularist takes the second alterna-
tive: although in a formal sense, supervenience entails moral generalizations
governed by a universal quantifier, these are not the kind of generalizations
particularists or generalists are calling “principles”. As Margaret Little
puts it, supervenience offers “the wrong kind of generality”.23 Since no
situations are exactly alike in all natural properties,24 each principle would
have only one instance.25 Moreover, these principles would be unable
22Dancy (1981), 367.
23Little (2000), 285.
24I do not argue for this claim here; even if it is theoretically possible that two situations
share all of their natural properties, this would not be damaging for the point the
particularist is making.
25See the discussion at Dancy (2004), 87; he concludes that “[a] principle that has only one
instance is worse that useless, for no such principle could ever be a guide for judgement.“
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to distinguish relevant from irrelevant properties, and hence be lacking
explanatory power. For moral practice, they would be completely useless.
2.4 Conclusion
To sum up the discussion about resultance and supervenience in regard
to their implications for moral principles, it is useful to recapitulate the
requirements for principles encountered so far and to see which of the two
relations satisfies which criterion. Valid moral principles of the form “If x,
then z”where “x”’ is a natural description and “z” a moral predicate must
at least26
1. have explanatory value in the sense that they single out relevant and
exclude irrelevant properties.
2. be without exceptions in the sense that there cannot be any situation
where the principle is defeated.27
Resultance satisfies the first condition but not the second while superve-
nience fulfils the second without satisfying the first. The price of singling
out some features as relevant is that other features go unmentioned, leaving
open the possibility that differences in the unmentioned features between
two situations might affect the judgement. The price of covering all features
is that the resulting generalizations are uninformative because they do not
single out the relevant features.
26More conditions are enlisted and discussed in Chapter 5.
27This second condition follows from Hare’s claim that principles commit to act in all
relevantly similar situation in the same way. If exceptions are allowed, it could just be
replied that the instance in question is one that does not fall under the principle because it
is one of these exceptions, and a further principle would be required to determine when
a relevantly similar case is an exception; if this principle is not exceptionless, a further
principle is required and so on in infinitum.
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The distinction between resultance and supervenience has been intro-
duced in order to show why Hare’s formulation of the universalizability-
thesis
(U) If x judges an action a to be right, and x takes the features
F1-Fn to be his reasons, then any situation which is identical
in regard to features F1-Fn is relevantly similar to action a and
must be judged by x in the same way.
is vulnerable to the criticism that in a different situation, a new feature
Fn+1might be present and change the judgement and (U) can however not
be defended by amending (U) to
(U’) If x judges an action a to be right, and x takes the features
F1-Fn to be his reasons and the features Fn+1-Fn+x to be features
whose presence or absence might affect his counting features
F1-Fn as reasons, then any situation which is identical in regard
to features F1-Fn and Fn+1-Fn+x is relevantly similar to action a
and must be judged by x in the same way.
(U) describes the resultance relation – it is picking out relevant features
in virtue of which the judgement is being made and leaves aside irrelevant
features. In response to the criticism that featureswhich have not beenpart of
(U) in the first situation appear in a second situation and affect the judgement,
(U’) is broadening the notion of “relevant similarity”. In order to do so, (U’)
has to include all potential defeaters, i.e. all considerations that might be
able to interfere with the original judgement. Dancy doubts that there is a
stable stopping point for those features which might possibly play a role in
the ethical judgement. Hence, (U’) moves away from resultance towards
supervenience.28 While (U’) escapes the original criticism raised against
28Although it is hard to imagine that every feature of a situation has be enumerated
among the possibly relevant features, as Dancy seems to imply (see his (1993), 81) – but
how could the number of clouds in the sky have an influence on a judgement about the
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(U), it becomes vulnerable to the new problems linked with supervenience.
Therefore, Hare’s defence turns out not to be helpful for him. Universality,
understood as the claim that wherever the natural properties are identical,
the moral judgement must be identical as well, does not imply principles.29
To see the impact of the refutation of Hare’s universalizability thesis
for ethical reasoning in general, it is important to notice that the structure
of Hare’s argument can be found in many moral theories. James Rachels,
for example, tries to establish that in a certain case, the difference between
killing and letting die does not make a difference for the evaluation of the
action.30 Then he goes on to argue that given that the difference cannot
be isolated as morally relevant, it can never make a moral difference.
Apart from counterexamples which can be easily found against this claim,
Dancy argues that the structure of such reasoning is – like in Hare’s case –
misguided: “moral relevance is sensitive to context”,31 and whether or not
a feature makes a moral difference in one case cannot establish a principle
about its general relevance.32 The same is true about the popular argument
that preferential treatment of human beings in general, of a certain race, or
permissibility of abortion? – the list of features is still indefinitely long, including things
like all possible intentions of people involved, biological facts etc. This point becomes
important in the discussion of what is part of a reason in Chapter 7.4.
29Even if Hare was right with his universality-thesis, Dancy argues that this would raise
problems for the possibility of regret and moral conflict. When we are facing a moral
conflict, we recognise that some reason counts in favour and some against an action. In
Hare’s theory however, only one principle determines the case at the overall level, and
those experiencing a moral conflict must be misguided. “Regret“ means that even having
done the thing we ought to have done, we feel that strong reasons have as well spoken in
favour of another action; this would have no grounds in Hare neither. I only mention
these points without discussing them since even if they are conclusive, they would merely
add an additional weakness to Hare’s position, but not help in my aim of discussing
particularism. For some further discussion, see Dancy (2004), 3f. and his (1993), 109-126.
30This is Dancy’s example, and it can be found in Rachels (1975).
31Dancy (1993), 89.
32At another place, Dancy adds to the list of misguided theories the Utilitarian Principle
(“that the right action is the one that has the best consequences for human welfare“), and
Bayer’s and Sidgwick’s moral theory. See Dancy (1993), 66.
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of male human beings is unjust because their distinct qualities are morally
irrelevant. How, it is argued, could e.g. the fact that human beings are
capable of abstract thinking and animals are not, if taken in isolation, justify
any moral difference?33 Again, it is the structure of the argument which is
misguided, but not necessarily its conclusion: “One cannot establish that
some feature is incapable of proving morally relevant in this sort of way in
advance.”34
What has so far been established for the definition of particularism? As
we saw in the beginning, particularism claims that moral reasoning does
not presuppose principles. For Dancy, there are two types of principles. The
first type is the “absolute conception” for which “all actions of a certain type
are overall wrong (or right).”35 This is Hare’s moral philosophy and Dancy
takes himself to have successfully shown that this version of principles,
taking “universality as a weapon”36 which clears the moral landscape,
is wrong. But he has also established positive elements in support of
particularism: the universalizability thesis – whether formulated on the
base of resultance or supervenience – turns out to be compatible with
particularism since it does not imply principles.37 As well, in refuting Hare
Dancy has introduced holism in the theory of reasons as his main argument
in favour of particularism, namely the thought that the moral importance of
33These generalizations are however not as strong as Hare’s universalizations which
claim that if the overallmoral judgement is determined by some features in situation a, all
situations with these features have the same judgement.
34Dancy (1993), 90. I am quoting this passage here because later on, when Dancy tries to
establish the possibility of invariant reasons, he seems to argue in a different way, as will
be discussed. See Chapter 6.2.1.
35Dancy (2001).
36This is the title of a subchapter of Chapter 5 in his (1993) where he discusses Hare.
37This argument against Hare might be taken as a defence against the charge that
particularism is incompatible with supervenience, which can be found for instance in
Crisp (2000), 42: “Particularism about reason implies the falsity of the universalizability
thesis. Since [. . . ] that thesis seems plausible, we have here a further argument against
particularism“.
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a feature cannot be predicted from one situation since it depends irreducibly
on the context.
The next step in refuting generalism is to attack a second type of moral
principles which claims that a feature which counts in one situation against
an action counts everywhere in the same way without determining the
overall judgement. This “contributory conception” is weaker than absolute
principles in that it allows that several principles apply to one situation.
The overall wrongness of an action must be established by weighing the
principles present against each other. There is no rule that determines in
advance how principles combine and which features have which weight.
The weighing is a matter of judgement. This intuitionist position has most
forcefully been defended by H. A. Prichard and D. Ross.38




3.1 Ross’s notion of “prima facie duty”
Ross’s intention is to give a theoretical structure to our everyday moral
reasoning. When we engage in moral deliberation, we take it that some
actions are better for being just, but this is not meant to exclude that other
features may be relevant as well. In fact, most of our moral decisions are
based upon a variety of considerations, some of them favouring and others
opposing the action. Moreover, we do not require that a morally relevant
consideration, like the fact that the act would be kind to somebody, has
always the same strength for our decision. Therefore, there is no system
of rules which tells us how to weigh different relevant and competing
considerations against each other in order to come to a conclusion. Our final
judgement is for this reason never more than a probable opinion and open
to revision. This allows to make sense of phenomena like moral conflict or
regret: we might be faced with a decision between two options that are both
supported by strong reasons, and we need to take a decision, feeling that
although our decision was right, the other way would e.g. have prevented
much suffering as well.
All these aspects from everyday moral life are what Hare’s approach is
sacrificing in order to make space for absolute principles that guide our
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deliberations. It would however be wrong to blame generalism for these
faults, since Ross tries to capture these aspects of morality and still to remain
loyal to generalism.1 The theoretical device which sets Ross apart form
other forms of generalism is the notion of a prima facie reason. Other then
in legal contexts, “prima facie” does not mean for Ross “at first sight”, in
the sense that what looks like a prima facie reason might turn out to be no
reason at all.2 In everyday language, a prima facie reason in Ross’s sense is
a consideration that “counts in favour of” or “is some reason for” an act.3
More formally, Ross himself defines prima facie duty as follows:4
“I suggest “prima facie duty” or “conditional duty” as a brief way
of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being
a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain
kind (e.g. the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would
be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind
which is morally significant.”5
This definition allows for all the characteristics of everyday life listed
above: it does not exclude that several features of a situation might be
relevant at once, it is compatible with the fact that the same consideration
may have different strengths in different situations, and most importantly, it
does not indicate any rules of how to weigh the different prima facie reasons
against each other in order to reach a final judgement. However, Ross
remains a generalist in that he presupposes that the valence, i.e. whether the
features count in favour or against an action, rests invariant. For example,
lying always counts against an action.6
1For this reason Dancy calls Ross theory “the best form of generalism“, Dancy (2001).
2See Dancy (2004), 5.
3See Dancy (1993), 97.
4Ross uses “prima facie duty“ and “prima facie reason“ interchangeable.
5Quoted in Dancy (1993), 97 and (2004), 18, from Ross (1930), 19.
6The list of prima facie duties includes the duty to keep promises, duties of reparation,
gratitude, justice, benevolence and self-improvement. More about this list and how it
should be interpreted in Chapter 8.
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3.2 Dancy’s critique against the
definition of prima facie duty
The particularist has two kinds of criticisms against Ross, the first concerning
the conclusiveness of his definition of prima facie reasons, and the second
concerning his generalist assumption that the valence of prima facie reasons
is invariant. As I will later on myself defend a version of particularism
which is based on Ross’s theory, I shall first show that the first criticism
is not successful, before I agree with Dancy’s complaint about invariant
prima facie reason.
Dancy’s criticism against the definition of prima facie reasons comes
in three parts. First, he points out that Ross’s formulation as it stands is
viciously circular, as the word “significant” which appears at the end of the
definition is just the concept that is at stake – the very aim of the definition
is “to understand [. . . ] what it is to be “relevant” to how to act, in the sort
of way that a contributory reason is”.7 Dancy himself offers an answer of
how to improve the definition in making it non-explicit:
“To say that an act is a prima facie duty is to say that, in virtue
of being of a certain kind, it is an act which would be a duty
proper if it had no other property that functions in this same
sort of way.”8
In this definition, Dancy claims that no circular appeal is made to
relevant properties, and this answers the first critique. It is however both
questionable whether the original definition is indeed viciously circular and
whether Dancy’s improved definition improves anything. Ross’s definition
would indeed be viciously circular if “prima facie duty” and “morally
significant” were both identical. This must however not be the case: a




prima facie duty and therefore be morally significant without being an
instance of a prima facie duty itself.9 Hence, although Ross’s definition
might be considered as circular, it is not so in a vicious way. But even if this
were the case, would Dancy’s improved definition be able to help Ross
out? Why should “a property that functions in the same sort of way” not
fall under the same criticism as the original formulation since “the same
sort of way” is just another way of describing what is meant by “morally
significant”? I conclude that this attack is not a threat for Ross.10
The second argument draws attention to the kind of definition Ross is
offering. It takes the form of an isolation-test, considering how a prima facie
duty behaves when alone, while the situations we are concerned about are
such that many morally relevant features are present.11 Even if technically
correct, this kind of definition is, so Dancy’s critique, not giving us what we
are looking for. It is as if the contribution of a football player to the team’s
victory would be characterized by mentioning what he would have been
able to do had he been the only player on the field.12 With this analogy in
mind, Dancy tries to put Ross in a dilemma: if he offers an account of how
prima facie reasons interact, these rules cannot cover all possible situations
and circumstances and would easily be vulnerable to counterexamples
similar to those levelled against Hare. If on the other hand Ross remains
9Much hinges on the question of what is to count as “morally significant“: if it is per
definition limited to prima facie duties, then the definition is viciously circular, but nothing
forces Ross to grant Dancy this point. Why not allow that enablers for prima facie duties
be as well morally significant as they have an obvious impact on the moral judgement
about a certain action?
10But as my aim is to present Dancy’s theory, I will use his “improved definition“ which,
while it does not solve a non-existing problem, is still no worse than its predecessor.
11“The definition is trying to characterize something that a feature can do in concert with
others by appeal to something that can only be done in isolation, and that is a peculiar
procedure“, Dancy (2004), 19, and “Essentially, the theory draws our attention away from
the interesting question about the behaviour of reasons when they are together, and tries
to get away with talking only of their behaviour in situations which don’t really happen“,
Dancy (2003), 102.
12This illustration is taken from Dancy (2004), 19.
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silent on how prima facie reasons can interact, he is criticized for not being
sufficiently informative. In answer to Dancy, Ross might illustrate his
strategy by pointing out how people come to learn chess. Normally, the
chessmen are introduced one by one, explaining how each figure is able to
move when alone on the board.13 Once these rules are grasped, based on
this understanding, the aim of the game, how to checkmate, is explained.
In analogy to chess, prima facie reasons are introduced in isolation. As one
of the differences between chess and morality consists in the fact that in
chess, the number of pieces and their possible moves are – unlike in the
case of morality – determined in advance, the second step, the explanation
of how to weigh the circumstances in order to find out the right thing to do,
cannot rely on any rules that apply to a finite number of cases. The analogy
makes it plausible why Ross is in a position to reject Dancy’s criticism that
the definition of prima facie reasons is too thin: he is able to accept the first
horn of the dilemma in a way that does not damage his theory. What Ross’s
definition is offering are the basic rules of how prima facie duties behave,
giving enough codifiable information for our judgement to decide how in
the complexities of everyday life, these rules can combine with each other.
This limitation must not, as Dancy intends to show, reveal an unfavourable
feature of Ross’s definition.
A third critique puts the most pressure on Ross’s definition. It claims
that his formulation does not cover all kinds of reasons. Since the definition
assumes that “each relevant feature could be the only relevant feature”,14 it
excludes those reasons which depend on the presence of another reason
(or reasons). For example, I might give the promise: “I will do x if and
only if I have some further reason to x”.15 The promise turns only into a
prima facie reason if a second reason is present, and this excludes some
reasons from Ross’s definition. It might look as if these kinds of reasons are
13This is slightly simplified; for example, the possibility of castling depends on the
position of other chess figures.
14Dancy (2004), 19.
15Dancy credits Ridge for this example. See Dancy (2004), 81 Fn. 5.
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quite peculiar, but many reasons fall under this description. Reasons for
forgiveness for example depend on reasons to blame somebody, reasons
to be merciful presuppose reasons to punish,16 and reasons to tolerate
depend on reasons to condemn.17 If it turns out that Ross is unable to
account for those conditional reasons, his definition is defective. To start
with, Ross might reply that the example of conditioned promise-giving
does not concern him since his theory is only about prima facie reasons, and
“some further reason to x” is not necessarily a second prima facie reason.
But the example can easily be repaired: I promise to invite you for cinema if
and only if it gives you pleasure. Since the second reason, that it gives you
pleasure, consists in a prima facie duty (a duty of benevolence), there must
in this case apparently be a “property that functions in the same sort of
way” in order for the promise-giving to turn into a duty. To see the problem
more clearly, it is helpful to apply the example to the improved definition
of prima facie reason and to see how the definition would have to look like
in order to accommodate such a prima facie duty that depends on another
prima facie duty:
To say that to go to the cinema with you is a prima facie duty is
to say that, in virtue of being the fulfilment of the promise to
go to the cinema with you if and only if it gives you pleasure at
the same time, it is an act which would be a duty proper if and
only if there is a property that functions in this same sort of way,
which is that it gives you pleasure.
16Dancy remarks rightly that “(i)t makes no sense to say of someone that they showed
“mercy“ to another, when in fact there was no reason to punish them to begin with“, Dancy
(2004), 19.
17The examples cover two types of cases: in the example of promising, the reasons lie on
the same side, while in the examples of forgiveness, mercifulness and tolerance, they lie on
opposite sides. It might be objected to the last example which is borrowed from Dancy
(2004), 19 that it is too strong since I have also reason to tolerate a form of behaviour in
others even if I am aware that I only dislike it and do not see myself as having reason to
condemn it. However, nothing hinges on the example and other cases can be found easily.
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The trouble with the isolation-test becomes now more apparent: the
content of the prima facie reason is such that it includes another prima facie
reason, and an isolation would deprive the first prima facie duty from being
a duty.
The strategy for a defence of Ross’s position consists in focusing on the
notion of “in this same sort of way” and in showing that the second prima
facie duty has to be interpreted such that it does not fall under it.
First, it might be pointed out that a prima facie reason normally depends
on many other properties. If I discover in our example that unbeknownst
to me you mixed a drug into my drink which caused me to give you the
promise, I would not have any duty to fulfil it. The same goes for all
conditions under which we consider a promise to be elicited by deception –
the promise will be void. Imagine furthermore that just before I am about
to leave the house to pick you up for the cinema, I got a terrible disease and
am unable to move my limbs. If I do not keep my promise because of my
incapacity to move, I have not violated any prima facie duty towards you.
To take another example than promising, the duty of reparation depends
on my having harmed somebody. Hence, almost every prima facie duty
might be described as follows:
To say that an act is a prima facie duty is to say that, in virtue of
being of a certain kind, it is an act which would be a duty proper
if certain properties are present, but these properties must not
function in the same sort of way as the property in virtue of
which the act is a prima facie duty.
This does not contradict Ross’s initial definition (or its improved succes-
sor). Now, what a Rossian generalist has to show in order to reject Dancy’s
third criticism about the formulation of the definition of prima facie duties
is that all properties on which prima facie duties might depend are such
that they do not function like a prima facie reason themselves. In this case,
there would be no prima facie reasons which conflict with Ross’s definition
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and all types of prima facie duties would be covered. The particularist
however will insist that some prima facie duties – like the example of the
promise whose content is conditional on another prima facie reason – are
special because they depend on other prima facie duties and hence are not
covered by Ross’s definition.
In order to defend his position, the Rossian generalist might use a
distinction on which the particularist himself heavily relies, namely be-
tween favourers and enablers.18 Both are different ways in which aspects
of a situation can function. Favourers are considerations that count in
favour of a certain action (and disfavourers count against it), while en-
ablers allow the favourers/disfavourers to count (while defeaters hinder a
favourer/disfavourer from playing a role in moral decisions).19 To be an
instance of a prima facie duty in a certain situation means that both the
necessary favourer and the enablers must be present. It makes no sense to
speak of a prima facie duty to keep my promise if the favourer – the fact
that I have promised – is present when the promise was obtained under
duress – i.e., when an enabler is lacking.20 Likewise, the prima facie duty
of reparation consists in the fact that I have harmed somebody – which
counts in favour of recompensation – and that the harm did not occur as a
consequence of self-defence – which would be a disabler. In the case of a
conditional reason, what is the role played by the circumstance on which
the prima facie duty depends? It is a necessary component for the favourer
to be able to count hence it is to be considered as an enabler. This however
is compatible with the fact that this feature plays at the same time a second
role in which it counts as a favourer for a different prima facie duty.21 To
18I will discuss later on the distinction in more detail and work now with a preliminary
definition which is however sufficient for present purposes.
19The example Dancy uses is that of a promise: the fact that I promised counts in favour
of keeping it, while the fact that the promise was not given under duress is necessary for
the favourer to count in moral decision-making. See Dancy (2004), 38-45.
20This will be the cause of Dancy’s problems with the favourer/enabler-distinction as
discussed in Chapter 7.3.
21As an analogy, take the case of a green point in a painting which counts only in favour
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say that the component plays always the role of a favourer is to confound
the way in which it might work in general and the way it works in this
special case where it plays a different role, namely that of an enabler. If this
is true, it gives the Rossian generalist a way out of the particularist’ attack.
Conditional reasons can be interpreted as normal cases of prima facie duties
where a favourer depends on further considerations which do not count in
this situation themselves as favourers. In the case of the promise to invite
you for cinema if and only if it causes you pleasure, this opens the way for
a highly plausible interpretation that is not available when the condition,
i.e. that it causes you pleasure, were interpreted as a prima facie reason – I
have two independent reasons to invite you when it gives you pleasure:
1. I have promised it under a condition that is now fulfilled.
2. It would cause you great pleasure.
Hence, the condition has a different function than that of a prima facie
duty and works therefore not “in the same sort of way” as the favourer itself.
Therefore, conditional reasons are no problematic category of reasons and
they can easily be accounted for by the definition of prima facie reasons.
3.3 Dancy’s argument against the invariance of
prima facie duties
So far, the attacks against the formulation of Ross’s definition of prima facie
duties have turned out not to be conclusive. The particularist has however
of the artwork’s beauty on the background of a blue shape. The green point favours the
beauty, while the background enables the green point to favour. At the same time, the
background can itself contribute to the painting’s beauty, being dependent on e.g. the
material of the paper which lets it reflect the light in a special way. In analogy to the case of
the conditional promise, it might be said that the background must be counting in favour
in order to fulfil the function of an enabler because otherwise, the painting would lose its
artistic quality altogether. Hence, the background has two functions at the same time, once
as an enabler and once as a favourer.
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a remaining argument that challenges an underlying assumption of Ross’s
ethical theory, the univalence of prima facie reasons.22 Given holism of
reasons, Ross has to show how the generalist element in his moral thinking
is compatible with the fact that the valence of a feature depends irreducibly
on the situation.23 It is not difficult to imagine counter-examples to the
univalence of prima facie duties. Take the prima facie duty of benevolence,
which requires increasing other people’s pleasure. An illustrative and
already classical counter-example comes from David McNaughton:24
“A government is considering reintroducing hanging, drawing,
and quartering in public for terrorist murders. If reactions to
public hangings in the past are anything to go by a lot of people
may enjoy the spectacle. Does that constitute a reason in favour
of reintroduction? Is the fact that people would enjoy it here
a reason for its being right? It would be perfectly possible to
take just the opposite view. The fact that spectators might get
a sadistic thrill from the brutal spectacle could be thought to
constitute an objection to reintroduction. Whether the fact that
an action causes pleasure is a reason for or against doing it is not
something that can be settled in isolation from other features of
the action. It is only when we know the context in which the
pleasure will occur that we are in a position to judge.”25
It is important to emphasize that in the example, the fact that the public
hangings produce pleasure to the spectators is not outweighed (which
22Dancy considers this to be his main argument against Ross; see Dancy (2004), 7.
23This is Dancy’s reading of Ross. Other authors interpret Ross in away that is compatible
with valence-switching at the level of contributory reasons; see Robinson (2006), 342-345.
As my main concern is Dancy’s theory which I try to build in contrast to Ross, I will not
address these different interpretations here; later however, when I defend McNaughton
and Rawling’s position, I will show how Ross could defend himself against Dancy.
24The general point was classic long before, but in the discussion of particularism, it is
McNaugthon’s formulation that is the point of reference.
25McNaugthon (1988), 193.
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would be compatible with a theory of prima facie reasons), but reversed.
No other prima facie duty can be declared immune against this kind of
counter-example.26 Circumstances can always affect the “ethical valence”
of a feature, whether it counts in favour or against doing something. Hence,
a theory which relies on invariant prima facie duties is impossible.
3.4 Conclusion
If this is true, then Ross’s theory as it stands has been shown to be defective
as well. Not the idea of prima facie reasons itself – the intuition that different
features contribute to the overall rightness or wrongness of an act – but
the underlying generalist assumption of the univalence of the prima facie
reasons is causing the problems. While the particularist applauds the
move away from Hare’s assumption that one general principle applies to a
situation, and supports the idea that there is no rule of how to combine the
various prima facie duties that apply to a situation, he worries that even
Ross’s position stops halfway between generalism and particularism. It is
particularist in regard to relevance and in regard to how contributory reasons
can combine – the relevance a feature bears depends on the circumstances
as well as the way they interact – but generalistic in regard to valence – the
direction in which it counts is always the same.27 The pure particularist
26It might be objected that the reversibility in this case is a special feature of pleasure,
but that it is difficult to imagine that e.g. a duty such as that of reparation or gratitude is
reversed (thanks to Sarah Broadie for seeing this point). The answer is that in opposition
to pleasure, the duty of reparation or gratitude are thick ethical features; these are in fact
invariable, but this is not a problem for the particularist’s argument, as I try to show in
Chapter 8. For those arguing that from the present argument, it only follows that pleasure
is variant, but that it cannot be granted that other non-moral properties behave invariantly
(e.g. the causing of extreme pain or physical damage on unwilling victims), see Chapter
6.2.1.1.2.
27This distinction is also made by Audi (2006), 292f. and by Lance and Little (2006), 575.
39
however can only accept a theory which rejects any appeal to the doctrine
of invariability.28 As Dancy summarizes this central thought of his theory:
“The core of particularism is its insistence on variability. [. . . ]
A feature can make one moral difference in one case, and a
different difference in another. Features have, as we might put it,
variable relevance. [. . . ] This claim emerges as the consequence
of the core particularist doctrine, which we can call the holism
of reasons. This is the doctrine that what is a reason in one case
may be no reason at all in another, or even a reason on the other
side. In ethics, a feature that makes one action better can make
another one worse, and make no difference at all to a third.”29
Dancy believes here that holism implies particularism. At other places,
he merely thinks that holism offers “at best an indirect argument” in favour of
particularism.30 Some authors have even suggested that holism is compatible
with generalism and that it is therefore not helpful for the discussion between
generalists and particularists at all.31 In order to understand particularism,
it is important to look at the link between holism and particularism. The
position I will defend is in some sense stronger than Dancy allows in his
last book. First, I present McKeever and Ridge’s criticism; then I show why
Dancy’s formulation of holism leaves open the possibility of principles.
Finally, I suggest a stronger definition of holism in the theory of reason
which excludes any form of generalism.
28In this sense, Dancy regards himself as a successor of intuitionists like Ross and
Pritchard, radicalizing the thought of variability. See Dancy (1993), ix.
29Dancy (2001).
30In his (2004), 82.
31See McKeever and Ridge (2006), 25-45.
40
Chapter 4
McKeever and Ridge’s thesis of
the compatibility of holism and
generalism
4.1 McKeever and Ridge’s attack
In opposition to most particularists who draw support for their theory from
holism in the theory of reasons, McKeever and Ridge argue that there is no
interesting connection between holism and particularism. On the contrary,
some generalist theories even require holism.1 To quote their main concern:
“The basic point is simply that there are two distinct issues
here. First, there is the question of whether reasons are context-
dependent. Secondly, assuming that reasons are context-dependent
there is the question of whether their context-dependence is
codifiable. An affirmative answer to the first question in no way
dictates a negative answer to the second.”2
1In what follows, I refer to holism in the theory of reasons in Dancy’s sense as (H):
“A feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in
another.“
2McKeever and Ridge, 28f.
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In the example McKeever and Ridge use, holism is required by the
following form of utilitarianism:3
(UT) The fact that an action would promote pleasure is a reason
to perform the act if and only if the pleasure is nonsadistic. The
fact that an action would promote pain is a reason not to perform
the action if and only if the person who will experience the pain
has not autonomously consented to experiencing it.
This theory would satisfy all of the conditions Dancy requires in order
to count as a principled ethic.4 It is incompatible with particularism as it is
completely based on principles for moral judgement. However, holism as it
stands cannot be used to criticize (UT) since it presupposes (H): if it was
not possible that a feature is a reason in one case and not in another, then
(UT) would be wrong, because the promotion of pleasure and pain is in the
formulation of (UT) sometimes a reason in favour and sometimes not. If
McKeever and Ridge are right, then particularism looks naked. In order to
defend his position, the particularist has to come up with an explanation of
the relation between holism and particularism which excludes any version
of generalism.5 To do this, he might formulate holism in the theory of
reasons in a stronger way. The particularist’s strategy consists then in
showing that McKeever and Ridge water down context-sensitivity so that
atomistic elements are still presupposed by (UT). I start with an attempt to
capture Dancy’s intention when formulating holism.
3See McKeever and Ridge 31. For a more complicated example which makes however
the same point, see Jackson, Petit and Smith (2000), 97.
4I will discuss these conditions in Chapter 5; Principles must, as Dancy lays out in his
(2004), 116f., cover all actions, tell why something is wrong, be learnable and “be capable
of functioning as a guide to action in a new case“.
5In his (2004), Dancy chooses another line of defence. He argues that even if a principled
ethic would be compatible with holism, it would be a “cosmic accident“ if it turned out to
be true. See Dancy (2004), 82. McKeever and Ridge dispute in their (2006), 32-41 forcefully
this thought. I will not discuss the matter here since I believe that the best way of defending
particularism consists in not granting the generalist that a principled ethics is consistent
with holism.
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4.2 The introduction of holism
Dancy introduces holism first for theoretical reasons. That something before
me seems to be red is normally a reason to believe that it is in fact red. If I
have however taken a drug that changes my colour-perception so that all
red things become blue and vice versa, the fact that something seems red to
me is rather a reason to believe that it is blue. This shows that theoretical
reasons are context-sensitive and that holism should be uncontentious in
this area. The same holds for “ordinary practical reasons”:6 that a candidate
wants the job might in one situation be a reason in favour of giving it to
her, but not in another. Aesthetic reasons behave no different: a certain
element can add to the beauty of one painting but ruin another. If theoretical,
ordinary practical and aesthetic reasons behave holistically, why should
moral ones be different? The causing of pain counts against an action, but
not if it is part of a justified punishment.7 However, it might count against it
if it turns out that the sentence is based on false information. Again, moral
reasons seem to be holistic. It is therefore very plausible to suppose that all
kinds of reasons behave holistically; sometimes, they count in favour, but in
other circumstances, they do not count at all or even against an action.
Reasons might even behave in a way that they count in favour and
against an action at the same time. Dancy uses the example of a paper he
submitted to a journal. The fact that he had already published two articles
in that same journal was a reason for publishing a third in order to complete
the series but also a reason for publishing other authors for the sake of
variety.8
6Dancy (2004), 74.
7For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that causing pain can be part of a justified
punishment. It might be replied that what counts against the action is simply that the
action causes pain and is not part of a justified punishment. Dancy discusses this reply,
but argues that what counts against the action is only the fact that it causes pain, and not
the conditions which have to hold in addition. For more on this point, see Chapter 7.3.
8See Dancy (1993), 62.
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Atomism in the theory of reason is the thought that if a feature is a reason
in one case it must remain a reason with the same polarity in any other case.
In Dancy’s formulation, holism in the theory of reasons consists merely in
the negation of this claim: “a feature that is a reason in one case may be no
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another”.9 This formulation is able
to account for all the phenomena alluded to in the examples above since it
does not require that the behaviour of a feature in one case determines its
behaviour in another.
4.3 Holism re-formulated
This notion of holism is widely accepted in the literature, and I will not
contest it.10 However, it might leave out an important aspect: Why do
reasons behave in such a way?11 A broader formulation would address this
9See Dancy (2004), 7. A much weaker form of holism is defended by Lance and Little
(2006), 580: “Philosophers are deserving of the name “holist” just so long as they think, that
is, that there are some moral reasons that do not function as such in virtue of substantive,
exceptionless generalizations“.
10Note though that McDowell’s version of particularism, which Dancy regards as a
predecessor to his own position (see Dancy (1983), 530 and (1993), x), is built on a version
of holism that is weaker in important aspects. McDowell’s point is that any codification
of moral knowledge will be confronted with unanticipated cases that require a different
judgement. The reason is that new circumstances might defeat the judgement which is
based on the codification. It is the new features that make the difference, but this does not
mean that the “old“ features behave in a different way, as Dancy holds. “On McDowell’s
view, if in one situation circumstances A1...An imply judgement Jn, then in a new case it is
a new antecedent – A1...An, An+1 – that gives a different judgement. But for this to be the
case it is not necessary to say that A1...An are themselves implying a different conclusion.
This is what Dancy adds“ Kaebnick (1999), 44f. McDowell himself discusses holism in his
(1979), 336 and (1981), 143-145.
11In a small earlier paper, Dancy was already nearer to a formulation that includes an
answer to the why-question, but he has never again referred to it. Dancy (1992), 136: “The
claim that reasons are holistic is the claim that the status of a consideration as a reason can
be affected by its context”.
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question as well. Hence, it might be more exhaustive to formulate holism
in the theory of reasons as follows:
(H’) A feature that is important for determining the rightness or
wrongness of an action can always vary in a new situation in its
impact because other features might change the way in which it
is important for determining the rightness or wrongness of this
action.
This formulation has three advantages over the original definition of
holism in the theory of reasons:
1. It gives an answer to the “why-question”: features behave holistically
in the moral realm because other features might change the way they
work.
2. One point of the examples used to introduce the idea of holism is that
whatever the normal behaviour of a feature, theremight always be cases
where the feature behaves differently due to new circumstances.12
This is accounted for in the “always” of the formulation, pointing out
that any principle or rule capturing the normal behaviour might be
presented with an unusual case where things are different.
3. The formulation is not limited to reasons. After all, why should not
enablers or intensifiers be sensitive to context as well? It would be
easy to come up with examples supporting holism as well in other
areas than merely reasons: I have borrowed a book from you; when
I am about to hand it back to you, I realize that you have stolen it
from the library. This disables my duty to return it to you instead to
the library.13 Suppose that it comes to my knowledge as well that the
12See for an extensive discussion of this claim Chapter 6.2.1.1.
13I am adapting an example of Dancy which can be found in his (1993), 60. Some might
argue that the duty to return it to the person from whom I borrowed it originally remains,
but that I have to insist that the person returns the book. Nothing hinges on the example
however, and those with worries might choose another example.
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library manager blackmailed you to donate it to the library. In this
case, the disabler would have been disabled himself, and it might be
the right thing to return the book to you after all.
4.4 McKeever and Ridge’s attack in the light of
the new formulation of holism
With this extended definition of holism in the theory of reasons, is it still
possible to claim compatibility between (UT) and (H’)? There are two
arguments that show why (UT) and (H’) do not go together. The original
formulation of holism was compatible with (UT) because (H) left open a
loophole for McKeever and Ridge: it only required that reasons be able to
change their polarity or force, allowing for two readings concerning the
question of how this context-sensitivity might be satisfied. Either the set of
conditions under which the change of polarity occurs is finite or it is not.
The first reading however is clearly not in line with the original idea of
holism.14 This idea is that whatever we establish as the normal behaviour of
a reason, a counter-example might appear and change or sometimes even
reverse the valence or affect the importance of a feature. But to suppose that
the number of conditions can be codified just is to reduce a feature to its
normal role. (H’) accounts for the idea that the behaviour of a feature cannot
be predicted. Therefore, it is incompatible with (UT) which does not satisfy
the condition that it might always change in a new situation. McKeever
and Ridge have argued that formulations of holism like (H’) which they
call “radical” and “unrestricted” are question-begging in that they already
suppose what is at stake.15 But why should we exclude the possibility that a
consistent formulation of holism in the theory of reason entails the rejection
of generalism? McKeever and Ridge’s attack profits from the ambiguity
in (H) already pointed out. If we eliminate the ambiguity and formulate
14See Dancy (1992), 137f.
15See McKeever and Ridge (2006), 41-43.
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holism in a way that renders it compatible with (UT), it becomes clear that
McKeever and Ridge rely on a form of holism that is clearly not in line
with the intention of the examples on which it is based. (UT) would be
compatible with:
(H”) A feature that is important for determining the rightness or
wrongness of an action can vary in a new situation in its impact
because a limited number of other featuresmight change always
in the same way its import for determining the rightness or
wrongness of this action.
This puts the particularist in a position to ask: why allow for context-
sensitivity on the one hand but limit the extent to which the context is
allowed to change on the other? Why should we accept an apparently
random stopping point beyond which variability is excluded? This shows
two things:
1. (H”) is no alternative for somebody committed to the idea of holism
because it takes back what holism wants to achieve, the fact that
a feature which counts in a certain way here might due to new
unforeseeable features count differently there.
2. (H’) is the natural way of interpreting (H); it preserves the original
intuitions of holism.
A second, related argument against the compatibility of (H’) and (UT)
is that even if we grant that only a limited number of features is able to
affect a feature, what guarantees that these features always affect other
features in the same way, or that they sometimes even not affect them at
all? A defender of (H’) has no difficulty in dealing with these cases because
it does not limit the kind of impact they have. (H”) however is bound to
require that these enablers work always in the same way. The reason that
(H”) has to insist that the limited number of features has to operate “always
in the same way“ is that (UT) is built on the presupposition that the facts
47
that the promotion of pleasure is nonsadistic and that the causing of harm is
not consented counts always in favour/against the action.16 In conclusion,
holism as formulated in (H’) entitles to particularism. Principles in Dancy’s
sense are not compatible with the variance required by holism.
4.5 Conclusion
We have so far considered three theories opposing particularism: Hare’s
notion of universalizability, Ross’s theory of prima facie duty andMcKeever
and Ridge’s claim about the compatibility of holism and generalism. The
common element in these attacks is their attempt to establish a normative
theory17 which contains invariability. In the face of holism, they give
more and more space to the idea that context might influence our ethical
judgements in a way that is not capturable by codification. The spectrum of
the attacks is marked by two extremes – Hare’s generalism at the overall
level and his denial of any form of context-sensitivity and McKeever and
Ridge’s theory which allows even for context-sensitivity at the level of
contributory principles. The particularist’s defence remains – apart from
attacks against the very formulation of its adversary’s theories – the same.
Its core argument is holism in the theory of reason, its commitment an
ethical theory with variability on all levels.
16The motivation for spelling (H”) was to make explicit the conditions of (UT).






Although Dancy’s particularism can, as we have seen, be used to
successfully attack some forms of generalism, the exact formulation of his
own theory remains still unclear. Not only is his position open to several
interpretations, but Dancy also himself changes his point of view over time.
It is therefore helpful to formulate exactly what kind of theory has been
targeted by particularism, which claim is made by Dancy’s particularism
and why it has changed.18 For a better understanding of particularism, two
questions have to be addressed:
1. What counts for Dancy’s particularism as an ethical principle?
2. What is the position Dancy takes towards such principles?
18For the purpose of categorizing Dancy’s position, I will partly draw on McKeever and
Ridge’s and Lance/ Little’s attempts to structure the discussion. (See especially McKeever
and Ridge, (2006), 3-24 and Lance/Little (2006) and Little (2000).) Unlike these authors, I
will however not attempt to map the whole discussion which is still unclear and confusing
mainly due to the fact that apart from Dancy and McKeever and Ridge, there has been no
book-length discussion of the topic and the many articles around are addressing particular




What ethical principles are
5.1 Four conditions for being a principle
Whatever the formulation of particularism, the adversary is always the same:
ethical theory based on principles. It is therefore surprising that Dancy has
never given a systematic explanation of what counts for his particularism
as an ethical principle. Obviously, not every moral generalization can be
taken as a principle: alleged “principles” like “an action is either morally
required or it is not” are true by definition and not even a particularist
could object to them.1 But what separates moral principles from mere
ethical generalizations? Dancy mentions several characteristics of moral
principles at different places. In the discussion about supervenience and
resultance, we have already met some of them: (I) valid moral principles
must single out relevant and exclude irrelevant properties, (II) they must be
exceptionless and (III) they have to be applicable to more than one situation.
Later on, Dancy specifies principles as follows:2
1See McKeever and Ridge (2006), 5.
2How does this relate to Dancy’s distinction between the absolute and the contributory
conception of principles discussed at the end of Chapter 2? There, his intention is to
characterize the place principles can adopt in ethical theories like Hare’s or Ross’s. This
leaves still open the exact definition of what counts as a principle, and it is this question
Dancy is addressing now.
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“A principled ethics must meet certain conditions, which have
been emerging along the way:
1. Coverage: The moral status of every action must be deter-
mined by the principles, in one way or another. (Otherwise
the principles would fail to cover the ground.)
2. Reasons: Of each action that has amoral status, theprinciples
must somehow tell uswhy it has that status. (Supervenience-
based principles would not do this; they are too indiscrimi-
nate.)
3. Epistemology: Wemust be able to learn the principles, either
from experience in some way or from each other, i.e. by
testimony.
4. Applicability: The principles must be capable of functioning
as a guide to action in a new case; having learnt them, one
must be able to follow them or apply them.”3
5.2 A tension between principles qua standard
and principles qua guide
Given the centrality of the term “principle”, it astonishes how little Dancy
cares to offer a complete definition. He writes: “We could probably continue
the list, but as it stands it is enough for now”, without finishing the
discussion in the course of the book. It will still be helpful to clarify some of
these conditions. Dancy’s condition (2) requires that in order to count as a
principle in his sense, a generalization has to provide the truth-conditions
of a moral judgement by referring to sufficient features which justify the
application of the moral concept in question.4 This does however not
necessarily imply that the principle explains why those features which make
3Dancy (2004), 116f.
4For a similar formulation, see McKeever and Ridge (2006), 6.
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up the sufficient features play such a role; i.e., a principle of the form “It is x
to do y because of featuresN1-Nx” where x specifies a moral predicate, y the
action to be judged, and N1-Nx the reason why it is wrong must not entail
a final explanation of why those features have such a moral import. For
example, the principle “It is morally wrong to beat little sisters because it
causes them pain” does not need to entail a final explanation of why causing
pain constitutes a wrong-making feature. Condition (2) shows why Dancy
supposes that generalists about principles are at the same time atomists in
the theory of reasons. As it is the function of the truth-conditions to mark
the same moral import of the same features across all cases, atomism, the
thought that “a feature [that] is a reason in one case must remain a reason,
and retain the same polarity, in any other”5 is implied by principles qua
standards.6
The applicability-condition for principles (4) that Dancy gives stands in
a certain tension with principles qua standards. The fourth condition requires
that principles be helpful devices for the agent in finding out the morally
right action. Principles might therefore depend on the addressee: what is a
guide for a well-trained moral agent can be useless for a beginner. Hence,
the primary interest of this principle qua guide is practical, while condition
(2) focuses on a theoretical concern. The two aspects may fall apart: a
principle qua guidemight contain simplifications of an overly complicated
reality or rules of thumbs necessary for its practical purpose, leading to
false implications in some cases and therefore not offering truth-conditions,
while a principle qua standardmight be too complicated to serve as a guide
in everyday moral deliberation.
5Dancy (2004), 7.
6It is important to stress at this point again how crucial this implication is for Dancy – if
principles do not imply atomism, as McKeever and Ridge try to show, particularism would
be grounded on ineffective arguments. In Chapter 8, we will see that many particularists
try to construct generalizations which are not principles in Dancy’s sense but still play
some of the roles typical for principles, especially the guiding-function. For the implication
of atomism in moral principles, see as well Dancy (1993), 66.
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5.3 McKeever and Ridge’s attempt to reconcile
principles qua standards and principles qua
guides
McKeever and Ridge try to reconcile both conditions for principles:
“We can combine these aspirations [i.e. principles qua standards
and principles qua guides] and insist that to count as a moral
principle a generalization must both provide truth-conditions
for moral claims which refer to explanatory features and be well
suited to guiding action. Call such principles “action-guiding
standards.”7
Such action-guiding standards could be reached by looking for prin-
ciples that serve as guides and offer at the same time truth-conditions for
the application of moral concepts. It might however be that the moral
landscape is too complicated for standards simple enough to serve as guides,
as discussed above. Most or possibly all principles qua standards could
so be unsuitable as principles qua guides, leaving the class of principles
which satisfy Dancy’s condition (2) and (4) for ethical principles empty
and rendering the position of the particularist in Dancy’s sense trivial.
McKeever and Ridge propose therefore a way for reconciling both con-
ditions.8 Principles qua standardsmight indeed not be of much guidance
for finite creatures short of time for reflection and with a limited grasp of
complex truth-conditions. Utilitarianism for example is difficult to follow
au pied de la lettre since it is impossible for normal moral agents to estimate
all consequences prior to performing an act. Instead, many utilitarians
allow for two-level principles, where the folk morality remains in place and
functions as a guide for normal contexts. The task of the principle of utility
is only to provide the ultimate standard of right and wrong. A virtuous agent
7McKeever and Ridge (2006), 10.
8See McKeever and Ridge (2006), 9-11.
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stands out due to his capability to step back from the guiding-principles of
everyday morality and to assess the situation in the light of the principles
qua standards; in some situations, it might turn out that contrary to intuition,
he has to abandon his guiding-principles.9
Both kinds of principles depend on each other: principles qua guides
alone cannot guarantee to get it right, and mere principles qua standards are
too clumsy for our everyday lives. Only the cooperation of principles qua
standards and principles qua guides ensures that sound moral decisions can
be taken.
Can this model serve to reconcile the tension between two of the
conditions Dancy imposes on principles, principles qua standards and
principles qua guides? It might be objected that this idea, while interesting, is
too charitable to Dancy.10 In admitting not only that principles play various
roles, but also that these different roles are played by different principles, the
idea gives up a unified account of principles: the list of conditions quoted
could only be fulfilled by the interaction of various kinds of principles. A
defender of McKeever and Ridge’s position might reply that in Dancy’s
formulation, there is nothing that forbids such a move. He only describes
conditions for a “principled ethics”, giving requirements for a complete
ethical system that might as well consist of various kinds of principles. This
move is however not consistent with the way Dancy defends particularism
against generalism. In his discussion of Hare’s theory of universalizability,
Dancy charges Hare with not being able to offer at the same time the
exclusion of irrelevant properties and a complete, exceptionless formulation
of principles. This would require supervenience and resultance at once,
9For such an account based on utilitarianism, see Hare (1981); the example is discussed
by McKeever and Ridge (2006), 10.
10To be fair to McKeever and Ridge, they do not explicitly try to defend Dancy; they
only put forward a theory of how a particularist in general could conceive of principles.
Therefore, I take their position as an example of how Dancy might make sense of how his
various conditions of principles work together, since he remains silent on the issue himself.
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and this cannot be done.11 If he allowed for various kinds of principles
within a principled ethic, he would only have to adapt slightly Hare’s
theory in order to make it compatible with his claims. Instead, he rejects the
theory out of hand as being false. This binds him not to allow for different
kinds of principles when it comes to formulate his own conception of a
principled ethics. Therefore, in the framework of Dancy’s particularism,
there is no room for different kinds of ethical principles with different
functions. Principles qua standards and principles qua guides are not only
logically independent, under some circumstances they are as well mutually
excluding. This means that a tension remains and that Dancy runs the risk
of putting too many restrictions on what constitutes his counter-position.
He might end up agreeing with everybody.
11For explanations of these terms, see my discussion of Hare earlier on.
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Chapter 6
The best version of particularism
Once it is clarified how Dancy understands ethical principles, the next
question to be addressed is what position he takes towards them. Several
options have been defended by particularists: that there are no moral
principles at all; or weaker, that nothing speaks in favour of the assumption
that moral principles exist. Still weaker, it has been held that although
ethical principles might exist, we ought not to rely upon them. The weakest
form of particularism would claim that the possibility of moral thought
and judgement does not depend on moral principles.1 My aims in what
follows are to show how Dancy weakened his position over time from one
1These positions are part of the cartography of particularism McKeever and Ridge
(2006), 4-25 are offering; I will not discuss all of these positions but refer only to those Dancy
has been defending. One further position would be to defend an error-theory of ethics
which claims that there are no moral properties at all, and this would exclude principles as
well. This would collapse the discussion of particularism into the old quarrel between
moral scepticism and moral realism. However, most particularists, and especially Dancy,
reject moral scepticism and want to place the discussion withinmoral realism. See on this
point Dancy’s initial clarification in Ethics without Principles: “[T]here are plenty of attacks
on principles in this book. It is for this sort of reason that particularism is often mistakenly
thought of as an attack on morality – as a form of moral scepticism. That would be quite
wrong. Particularists, if they are anything like myself, think that morality is in perfectly
good shape and functioning quite happily, and that abandoning the mistaken link between
morality and principles is if anything a defence of morality rather than an attack on it.“ (1)
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of the former to the last version of particularism listed above, to explain the
reasons for this shift and finally to ask which of these positions is the most
convincing. For a short overview of all versions of Dancy’s particularism,
see the appendix to Chapter 6.
6.1 Extreme and strong particularism
In his earlier attacks on generalism,2 Dancy defends a “thorough particular-
ism”3, arguing on the basis of holism that no principles exist at all. Moral
epistemology works as well as moral metaphysics without any invocation
of generally relevant features. When trying to convince someone of an
ethical standpoint, people just describe their view of a situation in order to
show the significant features and do not argue for them.4 As descriptions
in Dancy’s sense only refer to the actual situation but not to general laws,
there would not even be a place for principles;5 the only thing needed is
imagination:
“The direction inwhich I think the particularist shouldmove is to
compare the activity of choosing some features of the particular
situation as especially salient (significant) with the activity of
the aesthetic description of a complex object such as a building.
2Among which I count his (1981) and (1983).
3Dancy (1983), 530.
4Somebody argues for his point of view when using claims such as: – ou should not
beat your sister because causing harm to unwilling victims cannot be ethically justified“;
convincing somebody by description consists in statements like: – cannot understand
how somebody who cares about morality is able to beat your sister. Look at how she
suffers unwillingly¡‘ I admit that it is difficult to formulate exactly the difference between
giving an argument and convincing by description, but as I will finally reject all forms of
particularism that rely on this distinction, I grant Dancy for the sake of argument that
there is a difference between giving an argument and giving a description.
5Thismeans that Dancy is not claiming here that ethical arguments involve no principles,
but stronger, that since we do not use arguments but descriptions to convince other people,
there is not even room for the question of whether we need principles.
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In such a description, certain features will be mentioned as
salient within the context of the building as a whole. There is no
thought that such features will be generally relevant; they matter
here and that is enough.”6
In its denial of the existence of all principles, this is the strongest possible
form a particularist can adapt. How radical it is in the end depends however
on what counts as a principle. In our moral epistemology, it is not only the
case that we do not require principles, but there is even no place for those
generalizations that are weaker than principles. I will therefore call this
theory “extreme particularism”.
In his Moral Reasons (1993), Dancy adopts a slightly weaker form of
particularism.7 Still, he denies that there is any prospect for principles
due to holism in the theory of reasons.8 It is not only false to think that
moral principles exist;9 appeal to them has bad consequences for our moral
judgement since we misunderstand the way reasons work. This makes
moral epistemology a straightforward matter:
“[O]ur account of the person on whom we can rely to make
sound moral judgements is not very long. Such a person is
someone who gets it right case by case. To be consistently
successful, we need to have a broad range of sensitivities, so
6Dancy (1983), 546.
7It is interesting to notice that inMoral Reasons, there is no explicit discussion of what
particularism is and how it could be defined. The book rather concentrates on a critique
of generalist theories like Ross and Hare. It is as well noteworthy that the first part of
the book (1-59) is dedicated to a discussion of particularism in the theory of motivation –
roughly the idea that what motivates in one case does not need to motivate in another due
to changes in the circumstances. However, this strand of particularism has barely been
discussed in the literature, which might be due to the fact that it is based on contentious
claims about motivational internalism, cognitivism and moral realism, so that people
prefer to discuss particularism in the theory of reasons which relies on fewer controversial
assumptions.
8See Dancy (1993), 66.
9See Dancy (1993), 69f.
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that no relevant features escape us, and we do not mistake its
relevance either. But that is all there is to say on the matter. The
only remaining question is how we might get into this enviable
state. And the answer is that for us it is probably too late.”10
As with extreme particularism, ethical principles play no role in moral
judgement. However, Dancy tries to weaken the hard edges of his theory
and attempts to offer an account of morality which is not “too aggressive”
towards everyday moral practice which frequently employs moral gen-
eralizations. He does so by allowing for generalizations which function
as a reminder of how properties can affect an ethical judgement. Those
with moral experience have at their disposal a “checklist” which, although
by no means complete, indicates the impact a feature might have in the
light of previous cases.11 This does however not entail that those features
are necessarily relevant in this way, as claimed by those who believe in
principles.12 At another place, Dancy introduces a second and similar
way in which generalizations can play a role in moral judgement without
conflicting with particularism: there might be a “default tendency” inherent
to some features to count in usual circumstances in a certain way.13 The
difference from the previous position is that in extreme particularism, not
only principles, but also generalizations play no role whatsoever. InMoral
Reasons, Dancy tries to avoid a clash between intuitions and his theory by
looking for ways in which he can allow for generalizations – for instance,
10Dancy (1993), 64.
11See Dancy (1993), 67f.
12Dancy’s use of “generalizations“ and “principles“ is not unambiguous here (66-71).
It would be clearer if he did not call all sentences of the form “If x then y” “principles”
but reserved this label for those generalizations which satisfy the conditions he implicitly
uses in his (1993) and spells out in his (2004) as discussed above, and called the reminders
of what relevance a feature might have “generalizations”. For the distinction between
principles and generalizations, see especially Dancy (2004), 76.
13See Dancy (1993), 26. The idea of “default tendencies” plays a more important role
in his (2004) and is here rather sketchy. I only mention it at this stage for the sake of
completeness.
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that usually helping elderly people over the street is morally praiseworthy –
to play some role in his theory without conflicting with his main claims.
This does not however mean that he steps back from his main tenet, the
denial of ethical principles, as he understands them. I dub this position
“strong particularism”.
6.2 Weak particularism
While the distance from extreme to strong particularism is short, there is a
significant gap between these theories and a view Dancy has adopted in
more recent publications where he has weakened his position in important
aspects.14 I call this view “weak particularism”.15 In contrast to his previous
publications on particularism, Dancy gives in his (2004) a formal definition
of his theory:
“Particularism: the possibility of moral thought and judgement
does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral
principles.”16
On the surface, this definition seems to preserve much of his previous
thought on thematter as it is directed against the same opponent, generalism.
It is, like extreme and strong particularism, based on holism in the theory of
reasons. However, it rather silently steps back from the original claim that
14It is noticeable that Dancy is well aware that there are different forms of particularism
and that he is adopting a weaker form; see his initial statement in his (2001): “Moral
Particularism, at its most trenchant, is the claim that there are no defensiblemoral principles,
that moral thought does not consist in the application of moral principles to cases, and
that the morally perfect person should not be conceived as the person of principle. There
are more cautious versions, however. The strongest defensible version, perhaps, holds
that though there may be some moral principles, still the rationality of moral thought and
judgement in no way depends on a suitable provision of such things; and the moral judge
would need far more than a grasp on an appropriate range of principles.“
15Weak particularism has found its main articulation in Dancy’s (2001) and his (2004).
16Dancy (2004), 7 and 73; see 5 for a slightly different formulation.
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there are no ethical principles, as becomes clear in Dancy’s initial statement
in Ethics Without Principles:
“A particularist conception is one which sees little if any role
for moral principles. Particularists think that moral judgement
can get along perfectly well without any appeal to principles,
indeed that there is no essential link between being a full moral
agent and having principles.”17
This is an important limitation in comparison with Dancy’s older views
– remember the bold statement of extreme particularism that “there are no
moral principles” in contrast to the far more modest claim that “there is
little role for moral principles”!
Before I discuss this difference from extreme and strong particularism
in Chapter 6.2.2., I turn in Chapter 6.2.1. to another change in Dancy’s
position, the allowance for invariant reasons.
6.2.1 Invariant Reasons
A second radical amendment of weak particularism concerns the adaptation
of a further step towards everyday practice by allowing for invariant reasons.
The difference between an invariant reason and a principle is that principles
explain the moral status of every action and invariant reasons do not:
“For one might think that nothing can count as a principle, as
a source of moral distinctions, unless all morality stems from
principles; it couldn’t be that some of our moral distinctions are
principle-based and others are not, though it could be that some
of our reasons are invariant and others are not.“18
The idea of invariant reasons is that some reasons, like the causing of
gratuitous pain on unwilling victims, are, as we suppose in everyday moral
17Dancy (2004), 1. Emphasis added.
18Dancy (2004), 81.
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reasoning, always for the worse.19 It is important to emphasize that Dancy
is not talking about features that have always in the past counted against an
action and that can be expected to behave equally in the future, all things
being equal.20 Stronger, he believes that some reasons “are (necessarily,
given their content), invariant”,21 excluding the possibility that there might
be special cases where the context is such that the reason counts in another
way:
“Of course, if the feature is genuinely an invariant reason, this
fact, should we discern it, will be of use in any case where we
might be in doubt as to the contribution it is making.“22
I take it that he does not argue for necessity across all possible worlds,
but only within our actual world, as this weaker notion of necessity is
already enough for his argument. Anyway, from the quote it becomes clear
that he cannot mean that invariance simply signifies that the reason in all
actual cases counts in one way (this would have been an innocent position).
Dancy’s support for invariant reasons does not necessarily follow from
his definition of weak particularism. It is rather an independent input that
is supposed to be compatiblewith the definition, since it would as well be
possible to hold weak particularism and remain silent on whether invariant
reasons exist. But how is the invariance-claim thought to be compatible
with particularism, given that in Moral Reasons he still firmly rejects any
such reasons?
19See Dancy (2004), 77.
20Although Dancy does not distinguish here between invariant valence and importance,
I suppose that he takes invariant reasons only to have invariant valence and still to be
variable in regard to their importance. Everything else would contradict his intention to
come closer to everyday moral practice with his theory – even granted that the causing of
gratuitous pain on unwilling victims in fact always counts against an action, it is obvious
that it would make a difference for common moral reasoning whether the pain is inflicted
on, let’s say, a child or a convicted mass-murder (and the infliction is not part of the
punishment, i.e. the mass-murder is a victim as well).
21Dancy (2004), 77.
22See for instance his (2004), 78; emphasis added.
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Dancy has two strategies for showing that invariance is compatible with
particularism:
1. The question whether some reasons are invariant or not has nothing
to do with the question whether these reasons are holistic or atomistic.
Since for the generalist, the two questions are linked, the particularist
has to show that he is able to treat invariance in a different way.
(Chapter 6.2.1.1.) He does it by giving two arguments:
(a) Invariant reasons do not function differently from variant ones –
i.e., invariance is a feature that does not affect how we deal with
them, and if we treat an invariant feature as variant, this does
not involve any error of rationality. (Chapter 6.2.1.1.1.)
(b) Moreover, invariant reasons are not explained through their na-
ture as reasons, but rather due to their specific content. (Chapter
6.2.1.1.2.)
2. Even if invariance has to do with how reasons behave in general (in
Dancy’s terms, “the logic of reasons“), it can be shown that invariance
is compatible with holism. (Chapter 6.2.1.2.)
I will examine these points in turn in order to judge whether invariance
should be allowed within weak particularism.
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6.2.1.1 Invariance and the logic of reasons
Since at first sight invariance is an atomist idea – it states nothing else than
that what is a reason in one case is a reason elsewhere as well23 – the danger
for Dancy is that if he implements invariance, he accepts as well that some
reasons are atomistic.
Part of what makes Dancy’s theory attractive is however that he is
offering a unified account of how moral reasons work,24 and he is not
willing to give up what is in his eyes a central advantage of particularism –
reasons behave the samewaywhether they are reasons for belief or practical
reasons25 – despite his claim that some reasons are invariant. But is it
coherent to press both elements, a throughoutgoing holistic logic of reasons
and the claim that some reasons are invariant, together?
In support of this claim, Dancy argues that the invariance of some
reasons has not to be considered as part of the logic of reasons.26 Contrary
to him, the generalist thinks that there is a close link between the atomist
logic of reasons (or, perhaps clearer, of what it is to be a reason) – principles
are based on reasons that always count in the same direction – and the
question of whether reasons are invariant or not (the generalist might hold
that it is one and the same question whether reasons behave atomistically
and whether they are invariant). What Dancy needs to show against the
generalist is that, for him, the question whether the logic of reasons is
23The only motive to call reasons that always count in the same direction “invariant“
and not “atomistic“ seems to be that Dancy wants to perform the logically impossible and
drive a wedge between those reason that always count in the same direction and those
that always count in the same direction. Here, the fundamental incompatibility between
invariant, i.e. atomistic reasons, and holism can already be seen from the terminology.
24See Chapter 4.2., where Dancy points out that holism is uncontested for all kinds of
reasons and that therefore, it would be surprising if practical reasons behaved differently.
25For a discussion of this point, see Chapter 4.2.
26See Dancy (2004), 78. The talk of “logic of reasons“ sounds awkward here and is not
further specified by Dancy. What he probably means by this expression must be something
like “part of what it is to be a reason“. As Dancy is constantly talking about “logic of
reasons“, I will stick to this expression.
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atomistic or holistic is independent from the question whether some reasons
are invariant.
6.2.1.1.1 The functioning-argument in support of the independence of
the invariance of reasons from their logic
Dancy offers two arguments in support of his claim, the first one concerning
the functioning of invariant reasons. The idea is that for the particularist
invariant reasons do not function differently from variant ones, and this
sets him apart from the generalist.
In a “well-known”27 example, a fat man through no fault of his own is
stuck in the only exit of a cave that is filling with water. A family is caught
in the cave, but has available enough explosives to blow the fat man away
and to save themselves. The fat man is not happy about the plan, and
in fact, there seems to be some reason against lighting the fuse, since the
action would involve the causing of pain or even death of an unwilling
and blameless victim. Even if this reason is invariant, this fact does not
play a role in the explanation of why the causing of pain of an unwilling
victim counts against the action in this particular case. Somebody in the
cave, named Johnny, might formulate the reason against blowing the fat
man away as follows: “Although it would save our lives, this man would
suffer a great deal and we cannot hold him responsible for being where he
is; therefore, something speaks against blowing him away.” Johnny does
not refer to the invariance of the reason of causing pain to unwilling victims,
and he commits according to the particularist no fault in moral reasoning.
But does the mere fact that it is faultlessly possible in this case to use the
concept without referring to the reason’s alleged invariance prove anything
about the logic of reasons? Even a generalist like the utilitarian who would
argue that invariance is nothing but atomism and the denial of holismmight
be able to allow that nothing is blameworthy about an agent who never
refers to pleasure or pain as invariant features. It might be perfectly fine
27Dancy (2004), 78.
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in the eyes of the utilitarian, if for the agent, the prospect of causing pain
immediately and intuitively counts against lighting the fuse and if in every
new action involving pain or pleasure, the agent would argue in the same
way, never treating the causing of pain explicitly as an invariant reason. Let
us illustrate this with the help of Johnny: he always acts in a way utilitarians
approve of. What if Johnny did not care about moral philosophy and never
reflected systematically about the rules he is following? All he does is to act
according to what he thinks is the right thing to do at the moment he needs
to take a decision. Being asked for a justification of his actions, he is able
to produce a satisfactory answer, but he can never say if his reasons are
invariant or not.28 Is there anything wrong with Johnny? Given that he
reliably does what produces most happiness, the utilitarian should have
nothing to complain about.29 As with the particularist, there is no failure
of rationality involved if the fact that a feature counts against the action is
explained without appeal to its invariant logic.
As those who believe that reasons behave atomistically (the utilitarian)
and those who believe that they are holistic (Dancy) do not call for a
different treatment of the reason in the cave-example, the question arises
whether the logic of reasons as debated between holism and atomism has
any impact on our moral deliberation in everyday life. The answer is that
in most cases, the fact that I ignore in my moral deliberation whether the
reason behaves necessarily the way it does or not has no bearing on my
position whether this reason in fact is invariant or not. If I get it right, i.e.
if I recognize in the right way that a reason counts in a certain way, then
28Imagine Johnny is pressed to explain why he helped a victim of an accident. “Her arm
was broken, so I brought her to a hospital“ – “Ok, but what in the situation made you
think this was the appropriate action¿‘ – “As I said, she was hurt, and I thought I should
help her“ – “Yes, but why do you think hurt people should be helped?” – “Well, if you see
somebody hurt, that’s often the right thing to do“ and so on.
29After all, the utilitarian’s aim is that people act according to the principle of utility, and
not that everybody becomes a philosopher. The way people take their decisions should
therefore not be of importance for the utilitarian.
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how the reason behaves elsewhere does not matter. This is the case for all
situations where education, common sense or rules-of-thumb can guide
us. The cave-example is such a case: we intuitively take the causing of
pain on a blameless victim to count against the action. There is however a
second type of cases where it is extremely difficult to determine the right
answer without referring to the fact that a reason behaves necessarily this
way. Take the example of a competent speaker of a language who is able
to distinguish grammatically correct from incorrect sentences. In easy
grammatical questions, he can immediately and reliably produce the right
answer. However, in very complex grammatical questions which go beyond
his grasp of the language, he cannot ignore whether there is a rule that
helps him in finding the right answer or not since everything else would
be mere guessing and a faulty way of grammatical reasoning. He must
be aware of the grammatical principle or consult a grammar in order to
respond adequately to the question.
Morality is similar in this respect to grammar. There are also hard cases
like Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Trolley-problem where we lack an intuitive
answer. We must dispose of and refer to principles or invariant features in
order to discuss and eventually solve the question. Here, Dancy’s argument
does not work, since it doesmatter whether we treat our reasons as invariant
or not. Even if he disagrees here that we need principles to solve cases like
the Trolley -problem, he is not free to claim that it does not matter for the
use of the reason whether it is invariant of not. Hence, the logic of reason,
i.e. what it is to be a reason, is not independent of the question of whether
the reason is invariant or not, even if in most cases, the distinction does not
come into play. Consequently, Dancy’s functioning-argument cannot claim
that there are two separate questions, namely whether reasons are holistic
or atomistic and whether they are invariant or not.
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6.2.1.1.2 The argument from source
A second rationale Dancy gives for a uniform logic of reasons despite
some invariant ones aims at the source of the invariance claiming that
“invariant reasons, should there be any, will be invariant not because they
are reasons but because of their specific content”.30 What Dancy wants to
say is apparently that since the invariance is only due to the peculiar content
of the reason and since the invariance is not justified by reference to the
way reasons function in general, the “logic of reasons” cannot be affected. It
is as if the structure of reasons would, even in the case of invariant reasons,
still be such that it allowed for holistic behaviour, i.e. variance, but that
the content of the reason limits its behaviour so that it does not change its
valence from situation to situation. For example, if the causing of harm to
innocent victims counts always against an action and if reasons normally
behave holistically, then what makes this reason invariant is not any formal
feature that it would not share with variant reasons but rather the fact
that it seems impossible to imagine a situation where the causing of pain
on innocent victims counts in favour of an action. If this was true, there
might, as Dancy argues, be space to claim that the logic of reasons remains
throughout holistic while its actual behaviour is due to its content atomistic.
This would, on the one hand, be attractive for the weak particularist, since
it allows for accommodating his theory to many aspects of everyday moral
life. Might it not turn out that we would be able to find quite a few of
those invariant reasons? Perhaps, it is even possible to offer a refined
formulation of utilitarianism that comes near to weak particularism?31 On
the other hand, the price of this move is to make particularism so weak that
it becomes trivial. If all that particularism has to say is that, although there
30Dancy (2004), 77.
31In order to be compatible with particularism, this version of utilitarianism would
however have to allow that not all situations are subsumed under its principle. It is clearly
possible to formulate such a theory.
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are both holistic and atomistic reasons, their logic remains holistic, it fails
short of its initial claim to challenge much of traditional ethical theory.
There is a reply to the argument for the compatibility of particularism
and invariant reasons based on the distinction between the content and
the “logic” of reasons. It starts with an analysis of what is required for
a reason to be invariant in Dancy’s strong sense and goes on to doubt
whether the content of a reason is able to meet these requirements. As
seen above, in order to count as invariant a reason must never change its
ethical valence: all possible instances of a reason, be it in the past, present
or future, must count in the same direction. Everything that falls short
of an exceptionless behaviour could not count as invariant, but rather as a
mere statistical generalization or a probable and plausible prediction of
how a reason behaves normally. If there are any such invariant reasons,
then they can be used to predict how the reason will behave in the future.
Is the content of a reason able to change a holistic, variant reason into an
invariant one? Can the content of a reason justify a statement like:
Consideration x always counts against an action, regardless of
how the context changes?32
Normally, whether something counts in favour or against an action
has to be considered in its specific context. The valence of an ethical
consideration can be determined only when no further disabler is present
and when nothing stops the enablers. Given this holistic thought, why
should we think that the content of some reasons makes them count always
in the same direction? In some cases, like the causing of pain in unwilling
victims, the weak particularist might reply that the ethical valence of a
reason is so “obvious”,33 that it is inconceivable that the reasonmight count in
favour of an action in other circumstances. But is such an intuition enough
to exclude that, even in very unlikely circumstances, the reason might not
32Notice how this formulation of invariance is opposed to (H’)!
33Dancy (2004), 77.
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behave differently? Otherwise, Dancy commits an equivocation: “invariant
reason” would only mean that all we should be prepared to expect is that
the reason will behave in the same way it behaved in the past, but this is
not the strong notion of invariability, holding with necessity, that the weak
particularist is talking about.34
The strategy of the opponents of invariant reasons should consist in
showing that there exist cases where a reason that has once been considered
as invariant has, due to new circumstances, now to be considered as variant.
This would undermine confidence in the claim that the content of reasons
can function as the explanation of strong invariability.35 As holism was
introduced first for theoretical and then for practical reasons, the opponent
of invariance should be able to offer counter-examples for both kinds of
reasons that illustrate why their behaviour should always be considered
as variant. I will give some examples, starting with theoretical reasons.
Before 1905, when Einstein discovered the special theory of relativity, it
was considered as an invariant reason that the observer’s location in space
cannot affect the moment in time in which he observes a (distant) object.36
Since then, this belief has changed, and the relation between space and
time is nowadays considered as variant under extreme circumstances –
many changes of paradigm in sciences have turned allegedly invariant into
variant reasons.37
34This weaker notion of invariability would be nothing the particularist has to argue
for since it is nothing but the “remainder”-generalizations Dancy introduced with strong
particularism.
35Examples cannot serve here as a proof against the possibility of invariance due to the
content of reasons, but it shows that we need more than an appeal to what is usually
counting in one direction or what would be implausible to imagine to count in other ways
in order to ground invariability.
36I.e., the allegedly invariant reason consisted in the claim: The location in space of a
person can never affect the time at which he observes an object.
37It is perhaps a feature of all groundbreaking scientific discoveries that they question
reasons that once were considered as invariant and turn them into variant ones or reject
them altogether. Therefore, I think that the point is clear enough and I will not formulate
more examples for theoretical reasons.
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The same can be shown for practical reasons. To start with an example
of aesthetic reasons: once, it was considered as always counting in favour
of the beauty of a music piece if it respects the laws of tonality, but since the
introduction of atonality in the 20th century, for many musicians, atonality
might, if used in the right context, count also in favour of the artistic
quality of a piece of music. Similar examples can be produced for moral
reasons. The causing of pain on unwilling victimsmight be considered as an
invariant reason, but should this judgement not be revised in face of cases
like a new mortal disease which can only be cured if the doctor causes pain
and the patient is unwilling to receive a painful treatment?38 Hence, given
these very unusual circumstances, the causing of pain in unwilling victims
(or patients) should not be considered as invariantly counting against the
action.
The opponent of invariant reasons is now in a position to ask: what
entitles the weak particularist to suppose that there are some reasons which
should be exempt from holism which claims that there are no reasons
whose valence is immune from changes in new circumstances? Even if, at
the moment, it seems obvious that a certain consideration always counts
against an action, there is nothing that excludes the possibility of new and
unpredictable circumstances to change our judgement in the future. This is
not to say that it is wrong to hold – as people do often in everyday moral
life – that for example causing pain on unwilling victims counts always for
the worse, as long as the “always” is not meant hold necessarily, bearing in
38Here again, it seems to be question-begging to use the word “victim” in the description
of the invariant reason. Notice that in this example, it cannot be replied that the action is
to be rejected for the pain it causes but to be praised for the cure, because the cure just
consists in causing the pain; the pain is not a side-effect – the more pain is caused the better
the chances of saving the patient.
72
mind that it applies under “normal circumstances”.39 This is however a
weaker notion of invariability than Dancy is defending.
6.2.1.2 Dancy’s compatibility-claim of holism and invariant reasons
Hence, the two arguments Dancy has given in order to show that invariance
is not a matter of the logic of reasons have both failed – even if invariant
reasons function in some cases like variant ones, this does neither prove
that this is so in all instances, nor is it the case that the content is responsible
for the invariance. Therefore, Dancy has to turn to his second argument
which is supposed to show that invariant reasons are compatible with (and
not independent of) holism. He argues that particularists should admit
some invariant reasons
“because holism, as I expressed it, concerns only what may
happen, not what must. It could be true that every reason may
alter or lose its polarity from case to case, even though there are
some reasons that do not do this.“40
In order to justify invariant reasons, Dancy seems to rely on the fact that
his formulation of holism in the theory of reasons contains conditionality.
But how exactly does he interpret holism in the present context? To make
sense of the quotation, holism must be interpreted as:
“Some reasons change in their ethical significance according to
context and some do not.”
This is however an obvious misreading of his own formulation of holism:
39Therefore, it might be possible to argue that since people do not hold such a strong
view about the reasons they consider as invariant, there is no motive for Dancy to argue
for his claim: it threatens to damage particularism and it does not bring his theory closer
to everyday moral practice.
40Dancy (2004), 77; emphasis added.
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“[A] feature that is a reason in one case may be no reason at all,
or an opposite reason, in another.”41
It is clear when considering this passage that the “may” refers to what can
happen to all reasons and it does not mean that it may be that some reasons
are sensitive to context. Dancy’s present interpretation of holism allows him
to claim that holism is compatible with invariability; invariability however
is at the same time compatible with atomism which holds that “a feature
that is a reason must remain a reason, and retain the same polarity, in any
other”.42 Holism and atomism in the theory of reasons are antonyms and it
would therefore be surprising if both the logic of reasons was holistic and if
some reasons were at the same time atomistic. If we correct Dancy’s faulty
interpretation of holism, then it becomes clear that if all reasons may vary
in their ethical impact due to context, there is no space for some reasons
which necessarily cannot change.43
In summary: whether some reasons are invariant or not is a question
that has to do with the logic of reasons; holism however does not allow
for invariant reasons, but excludes it. If Dancy wants to insist on invariant
reasons in his conception of weak particularism, he has to live with a
“bifurcated conception of morality”,44 where holism is restricted to most
reasons, while the rest behaves atomistically. The other option would be
to give up invariant reasons. The first worry about weak particularism is
therefore settled. What about the second feature that setsweak particularism
41Dancy (2004), 7. It might be confusing that the first formulation talks about “features“
and the second about “reasons“. It is however Dancy’s position that all reasons are features
or facts about the world, and that desires do not give us reasons (Dancy (2004), 75: “it is not
our desires that give us or ground our reasons“) I will not discuss or contest this position
here. See his (1993), Chapter 1, and especially 30-34 for more on this fundamental point.
42Dancy (2004), 7. However, the claim of atomism extends to all reasons and here, only
the status of some reasons is at stake.
43It might, of course, be contested that there are no invariant reasons, but this position




apart from extreme or strong particularism, namely the silence on the
question whether principles exist or not?
6.2.2 Weak particularism and principles
The main motivation behind weak particularism is that Dancy does not
believe any more that holism directly implies the denial of moral principles.
Instead, he thinks that McKeever and Ridge’s argument, as discussed
in Chapter 4, has successfully shown that holism is compatible with
principles.45 Once this is granted, the next question for Dancy is whether
there are enough principles to cover the ground so that all of ethics is
principled. If this was the case, it would be difficult to claim that our moral
thinking and judgement does not depend on principles, because it would
be odd if all morality was principled, i.e. if all situations were covered
by moral principles, and if sound moral thought and judgement would
nonetheless not need to rely on them.46 Hence, holism alone does not
suffice to guarantee the truth of particularism. This is the reason why Dancy
needs an extra-step in his argument for particularism: against the idea of
a complete coverage of ethical principles over all situations, Dancy puts
forward the “cosmic accident thesis”, i.e. the thought that although it is
theoretically possible that the entire moral realm is codified, there is no
reason to expect it to be so. A codified ethics is only one possibility among
45Dancy (2004), 80f. “The real question is what our general holism establishes about
moral principles. On occasions I have been rash enough to claim that, given holism, moral
principles are impossible. [. . . ] Consider the following principle: P1. If you have promised,
that is some reason to do the promised act, unless your promise was given under duress.
[. . . ] Now suppose that we have a set of such principles, all of them explicitly allowing for
cases in which the normally reason-giving feature would fail to perform that role. And
suppose that our set is wide or large enough to cover the ground, in the sense that it
specifies all the moral reasons that are there. (There is nothing in the holism argument to
show that such a thing is impossible.) The result is a principled but holistic ethic.“
46See Robinson (2006), 331f. Another position is that these principles might be so difficult
that they are not of any epistemic use; for this idea (which I finally adopt) see Chapter 7.5.
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an indefinite number of options and nothing increases the likelihood of this
one option to occur.47 A codifiable ethics would be “pure serendipity”.48
With this second step in place, particularism follows from holism and the
cosmic accident thesis, but the conclusion is weaker than in the earlier
formulations of his theory:
“It was because of this issue that I characterized particularism as
I did above, as the claim that the possibility of moral thought and
judgement (and in general, one might say, of moral distinctions)
in no way depends on the provision of a suitable set of moral
principles. So characterized, it seems to me that particularism
does follow from holism. What does not follow is a straight
denial of the possibility of a moral principle, or at least of an
invariant reason.”49
6.2.3 The formulation of weak particularism
It is true that this formulation is weaker than the previous ones since it
does not touch on the issue whether principles exist or not, but claims
merely that moral judgement does not depend on them.50 But is this
47McKeever and Ridge put forward an interesting argument against this claim, but as in
my opinion, Dancy’s argument is already faulty at an earlier stage (I do not think, as I have
discussed earlier, that Dancy should allow that holism is compatible with principles at all),
I will not discuss their arguments here. See their (2006), 32-41 for detailed discussion.
48Dancy (2004), 82. “[G]iven the holism of reasons, it would be a sort of cosmic accident
if it were to turn out that a morality could be captured in a set of holistic contributory
principles of the sort that is here suggested. [. . . ] It would be an accident because, given
the holism of reasons, there is no discernible need for a complete set of reasons to be like
this.“
49Dancy (2004), 82.
50In the next chapter, I will arrive at a similar conclusion. The reason why I am criticising
this formulation of particularism here is that in the present context, I only consider whether
it is consistent for Dancy to defend such a definition given his own premises. I will state
a form of particularism that comes quite close to Dancy’s here, but based on different
assumptions about the force of holism.
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formulation the appropriate response to McKeever and Ridge’s argument?
Weak particularism as formulated faces a dilemma: Either, in spite of the
cosmic accident thesis, we are living in an unlikelyworldwhere all situations
are covered by principles and weak particularism is wrong.51 Morality is
principled and our moral judgement will have to take this fact somehow
into account. Or, we are living in a world that is not covered by principles
and, although the formulation of weak particularism is not wrong, there is
no need for the particularist to step back from the stronger formulations
of particularism. The reason is that if principles do not cover the whole
ground, they have to be considered merely as generalizations, as Dancy
himself stresses when rejecting that invariant reasons count as principles,
and also earlier on when he is discussing conditions for principles.52Hence,
even if our world contained some generalizations which are, in Dancy’s
view, compatible with holism, there would be no principles at all – since
principles can only exist as a net of generalizations which is wide enough
to subsume all situations.
Therefore, a more forceful formulation of weak particularism that
includes a reference to the extreme unlikelihood of principles is possible.
Consequently, Dancy might reformulate weak particularism as follows:
It is extremely unlikely that moral principles exist and therefore,
we should not expect that the possibility of moral thought and
judgement depends on any ethical principle.
51The cosmic accident thesis is not a strict proof against a principled ethics, but only gives
an argument why it is very unlikely that all of morality is principled. It is not an option for
Dancy that there are principles which are so complex that they are of little epistemic use;
the reason is that in his conditions for principles, he requires them to be able of guiding the
agent.
52Dancy (2004), 81: “The question whether morally is principle-based will not really be
being addressed, if we approach the matter this way. For one might think that nothing
can count as a principle, as a source of moral distinctions, unless all morality stems from
principles; it couldn’t be that some of our moral distinctions are principle-based and others
are not, though it could be that some of our reasons are invariant and others are not.“
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6.3 The best formulation of particularism
Since we have earlier on rejected McKeever and Ridge’s objection that
holism is compatible with exceptionless ethical generalizations, the initial
motivation for weak particularism, namely to account for the fact that
the argument from holism does not imply a direct denial of principles,
has been defeated and we should take the extreme or strong formulation
of particularism as superior to the weak version. But which of the two
formulations should we prefer? The difference between extreme and strong
particularism consists in the question whether moral judgement requires
some form of ethical generalization, and depending on our position on the
issue, we should accept the corresponding form of particularism.
Part of Dancy’s overall project is to adjust the way we conceive of moral
reasons to the way we treat reasons in other areas. There is no reason
why the ethical realm should behave differently, and particularism can be
seen as the spelling out of this basic thought. If therefore it can be shown
that theoretical reasoning requires some form of generalization, this would
shed light on the question how morality should be conceived, and also
whether to prefer extreme to strong particularism. Do we need some form
of generality when explaining how a feature behaved in a concrete situation,
for instance how a dose of chloroform affected some human person?53 The
explanation might consist in telling what concretely happened when we
applied the chemical: “First, the person felt nothing, but two minutes later,
her pulse slowed down, and shortly afterwards, she started sleeping etc.” It
might even be stressed that in slightly different circumstances, the injection
would have had a contrary effect or would have been neutralised. This
explanation is complete in the sense that a competent expert would not need
any further explanation for a full understanding of what happened. To see
why this has an impact on the present issue, consider a second story: “I
applied liquid honey, and first, the person felt nothing, but two minutes
53This example is taken from Chappell (2004).
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later, her pulse slowed down, and shortly afterwards, she fell asleep etc.”
While the first explanation would not prompt an expert to ask for further
information, the second story seems incomplete. The reason is that the
first story represents a usual case, while the second case is “scientifically
bizarre”.54 An expert would wonder why honey has such an effect here,
given that normally it has no apparent impact on whether we feel sleepy
or not. The lesson to be drawn from this is that in the area of theoretical
reasons, complete explanations are implicitly general. They work on the
background assumption that everything behaves “as usual” – a condition
that is usually left out but which could be mentioned as well. It is, even if
unmentioned, a necessary condition for a complete explanation.
Practical reasons behave similarly, as examples easily demonstrate.
Imagine somebody telling the following story: “It was already dark and
when he attacked her, she started crying for help. I took this as a reason
to intervene.” A competent moral agent will accept this explanation as
complete and take it for granted that anything aberrant fromusual behaviour
would have been mentioned.55 Hence, it seems that sound moral reasoning
is like reasoning in the theoretical realm referring to the general, normal
behaviour of reasons. These generalizations do not need to be exceptionless,
but they rather function as a help for orientation – if the reason behaves
differently, there will be some unexpected change in context that requires
our attention.
At this point, my intention is not to take up a position on how these
generalizations have to be conceived, but I rather want to show that since
generalizations do play a role in moral judgements, we should prefer strong
over extreme particularism.56 It is the task of particularism to find a way to
54Chappell (2004).
55E.g. that the person reporting this incident has forgotten to mention that it happened
on stage in a theatre.
56Again, I only claim that strong particularism is the best position when accepting
Dancy’s – not yet discussed – background assumptions. In the next chapter, I will challenge
some of them, and as a result, I shall prefer a different form of particularism.
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explain how these generalizations work without interfering with holism in
the theory of reasons. This will be the aim of Chapter 8; but before I turn to
the task of developing the most promising formulation of particularism,
I first want to pay attention to a further question concerning the very
understanding of the particularist’s project.
Appendix to Chapter 6
In order to clarify the differences between the various forms of particularism,















No No No No
Strong Particular-
ism (1993)
No No No Yes
Weak Particular-
ism (2001, 2004)
No It is unlikely that
principles exist,
but it cannot be
excluded.
Yes Yes
From the table, it can easily be observed that the more Dancy’s theory
develops, the more liberal it becomes in incorporating elements that were
originally conceived as generalist: while extreme particularism firmly
denies that that moral principles exist, that invariant reasons are possible
and that moral generalizations play a role in moral judgement, all of these







Particularism as a metaphysical or
an epistemic theory
7.1 Dancy’s conception of particularism
as a metaphysical and an epistemic theory
“Particularism: the possibility of moral thought and judgement
does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral
principles”.1
Returning to the definition of weak particularism and considering the
kind of theory that is on offer, it becomes apparent that the formulation
just quoted tries to give an answer to an epistemic question: Are principles
necessary for an adequate explanation of our moral reasons?2
Later in Ethics Without Principles, Dancy puts emphasis on particularism
as a metaphysical claim:
1Dancy (2004), 7.
2Unfortunately, Dancy does in this context not explain in what exactly moral judgement
or thought consists, other than that it is concerned with the explanation of our moral
reasons. I take it therefore that the aim of moral judgement and thought is to explain how
reasons work.
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“As I have presented it in this book, particularism is a view in
moral metaphysics: it is a view about the ways in which actions
get to be right and wrong.”3
This is interesting since, as we have seen in the previous chapter,
earlier on in his (2004), Dancy is denying that weak particularism has
a metaphysical view about whether principles exist or not; what counts
for weak particularism is that we do not rely on principles in our moral
deliberation, and it would be “pure serendipity” if the question how actions
get right or wrong has a principled answer. For the present context, it is
however not so important why Dancy seems to have changed his view
within his book, but that there are two distinct kinds of questions.
The questions of what makes an action right or wrong and what gives
an adequate explanation of our moral reasons are different. Is particularism
the adequate answer for both questions, i.e. is particularism entitled to
claim neither that moral judgement depends on principles nor that there are
any moral principles?4 To see that the two areas may fall apart, consider the
example of the Asian game “Go”. Here, it is possible that the question of
what makes a position favourable for white or black has an answer, i.e. that
there is an algorithm that determines which side is able to win if the players
play faultlessly, but such a principle is so enormously complex that human
beings cannot grasp it.5When human beings are asked for an explanation
3Dancy (2004), 140. In his discussion of extreme and strong particularism, Dancy
oscillates as well between both claims. Since he gives no formal definition of those forms
of particularism, it is easier to demonstrate the problem with the formulation of weak
particularism.
4Dancy himself asks whether “it is possible for the epistemology of a domain to come
apart in this sort of way from metaphysics“, but moves fairly quickly on to deny this
possibility since “[w]hether we are thinking about reasons for doing an action or about
reasons why it would be right to do it, any feature that is a reason in one case may be no
reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another“ Dancy (2004), 80. I will however try to
show that the question cannot so easily be dismissed.
5In the case of the game of Go it is so difficult to find a rule that determines which side
has the advantage that even the most powerful computers are unable to beat an average
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of their judgement on a position, they are often unable to offer more than
rough rules of thumb and to appeal to intuition.6 Hence, the question of
what makes a position better or worse for one side has a – principled –
answer, while an adequate explanation of a judgement about the position
has no answer that can be given in terms of principles. The same might be
possible with ethics: there are principles, but agents do not refer to them for
explanation of their reasons why they did a certain action.
7.2 Two kinds of holism
As we have already discussed, particularism is an implication of holism
in the theory of reasons. In order to see whether particularism gives the
answer to an epistemic or to a metaphysical claim, it is necessary to turn
again to the concept on which particularism is based. The strategy consists
in reflecting on the presuppositions of holism. This helps us to see more
clearly what question holism is able to answer.
(H): A feature that is a reason in one case (1) may be no reason
at all (2), or an opposite reason (3) in another.
It is crucial for (H) that in cases (1)-(3), it is always the same feature that
counts in favour, against or not at all, and not an agglomerate of the feature
and the specific context. To illustrate this important point and in order to
show that it is not the only way of conceiving the issue, take the example of
a spice: translated into culinary vocabulary, the behaviour of salt can be
described as holistic.
player. Notice that here, a tension in Dancy’s definition of “principles“ that has been
discussed in Chapter 5 becomes obvious: principles qua standardsmust provide a complete
explanation why the principle makes a certain claim, while principles qua guidesmust be
such that that the principles are applicable. In the case of Go, principles can only fulfil the
first of the two conditions.
6Usually, the better Go-players become, the more they rely on their intuition which
shows that the “ideal player” would operate totally without any generalization.
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(Hs): While a pinch of salt is responsible for the good taste in a
portion of fish and chips (1), it might not affect the taste of a pot
of acid (2), or even be responsible for the bad taste when put in
a piece of cream gateau (3).7
Holism of salt depends on a peculiar theory of what is responsible for
good or bad taste: fish and chips, the pot of acid or the piece of cream gateau
are the “context” that determines whether salt makes these “meals” tasty
or unpalatable (“Mmmh, the salt in my portion of fish and chips makes it
delicious!” – “Aargh, the salt in the piece of cream gateau is responsible for
its disgusting taste” – “Well, the salt in my pot of acid does not make any
difference”). From a different point of view, the contribution salt makes to
the tastiness of the whole “meal” cannot be considered in isolation. Rather,
the combination of all ingredients produces a good or bad taste. It is not the
salt itself that is responsible for the bad or good taste of the “meal”, but the
interaction of all elements. (“Mmmh, this combination of ingredients makes
a delicious portion of fish and chips” – “Aargh, these ingredients together
have ruined the taste of the piece of cream gateau” – “Well, whether this
pot of acid contains salt or not, it tastes all the same”). This theory can be
formulated in contrast to (Hs):
While the combination of salt, fish and chips results in good
taste (1), the combination of salt and some acids is not different
in taste from the mere combination of some acids (2), and the
combination of salt and the ingredients for cream gateau results
in an unpleasant taste (3).
To illustrate the difference between the two theories about the effects of
salt imagine somebody unfamiliar with common tastes and the preparation
7“is responsible for the good taste“ might be translated into “is a reason in favour of
desire to eat it“, “is responsible for the bad taste“ into “is a reason against the desire to eat
it“ and “does not affect the taste“ into “is not a reason which should affect my desire to eat
it“.
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of food. In the process of preparing cream gateau, he adds salt instead of
sugar. How do we explain to him the difference the addition of salt instead
of sugar makes? Those defending (Hs) will answer along these lines: “In
the context of cream gateau, the addition of salt decreases the tastiness”.
Those thinking that only the combination of the ingredients explains their
taste will say: “If you follow the instructions for producing a cream gateau,
but at the end you add salt instead of sugar, the overall outcome will not be
very tasty”.
Dancy is aware of both ways in which the relationship between a feature
and its context can be interpreted. He takes Robert Brandom to defend the
view that the combination counts and not the contribution a single feature
makes.8 Insofar as Brandom’s view is opposed to the atomist position that
features make the same contribution wherever they appear, it can be called
holistic, but not in Dancy’s sense. What Brandom attacks in atomism is that
a feature alone is making a certain contribution – in his picture, only the
whole can be said to count in a certain way. Dancy however accepts that
the feature itself counts in favour or against and not the combination of the
feature and the context:
“The difference lies in what is doing the speaking against in cases
where features are combined. In the former case (Brandom’s) it
is the combination; in the latter case (mine) it is the feature that
originally spoke in favour.9
8Dancy introduces Brandom’s theory with a slightly different example: When I strike
a match, it will light. Certain conditions might however occur and cause the match not
to light; further conditions might occur as well and disable the effect of the conditions
that stop the match from lighting, so that the match lights after all etc; see Dancy (2004), 8.
Brandom’s example differs from mine in that the feature he starts with – the lighting of a
match – has itself an effect, while in my example, salt makes a difference to the quality of
the taste only when added to other ingredients. Both examples illustrate however the
main point that when a feature is added to others, the difference that is caused can only be
attributed to the whole.
9Dancy (2004), 8. Whether in fact Brandom defends such a theory is another question.
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Why is it so important for Dancy to understand holism this way? What
would happen if he accepted Brandom’s interpretation? It would deprive
Dancy from holding that what is a reason in one case counts differently
in other cases because, with Brandom-style holism, it is not possible to
isolate certain features as reasons: what is doing the counting is the whole.
But if this cannot be done, then it cannot be shown that the same feature
counts in different cases in different directions.10 And if this is not possible,
holism the way Brandom conceives it does not imply particularism since the
denial of principles hinges on the claim that the ethical valence of a certain,
isolated feature depends on context. What Brandom-style holism does is to
apply the idea of the context-dependency of reasons to a different theory
about what counts as a reason. Therefore, Brandom-style holism cannot
be used to sustain Dancy-style particularism since both rely on different
presuppositions of what is a reason in the first place. Hence, one decisive
question, if not the real battleground for particularism, is whether context
should be considered as part of a reason or not. It might even be argued
that once Dancy has successfully established that reasons can be isolated
from the context and that context can affect how the reason counts, the
What is important for the present purpose is only that Dancy clarifies his version of holism
by putting it apart from other possible interpretations, and it does not matter to whom
these other possible interpretations can be ascribed.
10The difference between the two types of holism becomes more apparent when
considering (H’) which is, as discussed above, even closer to the spirit of Dancy’s idea
of holism: (H’) A feature that is important for determining the rightness or wrongness
of an action can always vary in a new situation in its impact because other features
might change the way it is important for determining the rightness or wrongness of this
action. In this formulation of holism, Dancy’s presupposition in the theory of reasons, the
sharp distinction between “a feature that is important for determining the rightness or
wrongness of an action“ and those “features that might change the way it is important” is
the cornerstone of the formulation. Here, the incompatibility with Brandom-style holism
is still clearer.
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main philosophical work is done and the rest is just the spelling out of the
implications: holism and particularism.11
7.3 Favourers and enablers
In order to defend his view against alternative theories like Brandom’s,
Dancy explains his distinction between reasons and contextwith an example:
1. ”I promised to do it.
2. My promise was not given under duress.
3. I am able to do it.
4. There is no greater reason not to do it
5. So: I do it.”12
(5) is the “conclusion” of the “premises” (1)-(4).13 The elements that lead
to the “conclusion” play different roles. Dancy takes (1) to favour (5), while
(2) – (4) are necessary for (1) to count in favour of (5), but they do not count
themselves in favour of it.
“What this means is that in the absence of (2), (1) would not have
favoured the action. In this sense, the presence of (2) enables (1)
to favour (5). In my preferred terminology, (1) is a favourer, and
(2) is an enabling condition or enabler.”14
11The vocabulary of “reasons“ and “context“ is used in Dancy (2004); in his (1993),
Dancy relies on the tripartite distinction between moral reasons, active background and
inert background, where active background refers to those features of the context that
are able to make an impact on the reason and inert background refers to those features
that have no impact. See especially Dancy (1993), 55f. and Robinson (2006), 336f. In my
discussion, I will stick to Dancy’s terminology in his (2004).
12Dancy (2004), 38.
13He recognizes that these terms cannot be taken literally here, since “it is perhaps
awkward to think of an action as the conclusion of anything“.
14Dancy (2004), 39; the last two emphasis are added. Dancy (2004), 38.
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The favourer (1) is according toDancy identicalwith the reason;15 enablers
are those features of the context that are able to affect the favourer.16Instead
of taking (1) as the only element of what favours the action, it might be
suggested that (1) and (2) play this role together: the reason to do the
action is not that “I promised to do it” but rather that “I promised freely to
do it”. The justification for the suggestion might be that, in contrast to a
freely given promise, a coerced promise does not give any reason to act.
Dancy holds however that “[o]ne does not construct a larger favouring
consideration merely by putting together a favourer and an enabler”.17
If (1) counts already in favour of (5), then (2) must play a different role
and cannot be “agglomerated” to the favourer. It is important to stress
the significance of the question of whether (2), an enabler, is part of what
favours the action or not – on the answer depends whether the context
is part of the reason or not.18 In order to demonstrate that (1) does not
require (2) to favour (5), he argues that even if we perceive that a promise
has been deceitfully extracted, we often “feel some compunction in not
doing what [we] promised”.19Hence, (1) counts in favour of (5) even if (2) is
not present. Is this a convincing example? Those questioning that (1) alone
favours (5) might reply that the agent is simply misled by his feelings, and
that a falsely extracted promise does not give any rational constraint on
my actions: in choosing what to do, I can ignore the content of the alleged
15See as well Dancy (2004), 29: “[T]o be a reason for action is to stand in a certain relation
to action, and the relation at issue is that of favouring“.
16Later, Dancy additionally introduces intensifiers and attenuators whose function is to
augment or to reduce the weight of the favourer. However, these “forms of relevance“
(Dancy (2004), 42) play no important role for the current discussion and I will not discuss
them any further here. For more, see Dancy (2004), 41f. They correspond to what Dancy
calls in his (1993) the “active background“.
17Dancy (2004), 39. Here, the discussion between Brandom and Dancy about holism
pops up again in the terminology of reasons, enablers and favourers.
18Dancy recognizes how important it is that the distinction between favourers and
enablers in his sense is consistent: “[T]he favouring/enabling distinction is in fact central to
the particularist’s approach to these issues“ Dancy (2004), 73.
19Dancy (2004), 39.
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promise because, as it turned out, it has been extracted from me under
conditions that annul its validity. To reject this claim, Dancy would have to
show why the compunction is justified, and not merely that it exists.20 If (1)
alone does not favour (5), it becomes plausible to suppose that some other
elements like (2) that are considered as enablers in Dancy’s original picture
are also part of what favours (5). Otherwise, there might be situations
where a favourer like (1) is not favouring at all, and this would not be in line
with Dancy’s position.21 And if the reason is identical with the feature that
favours the action, then Dancy is wrong in claiming that (1) which counts
in his theory as a favourer alone constitutes the reason. Generalized, given
these worries, it cannot be taken for granted that reasons are identical with
what Dancy calls favourers since they alone might not be able to favour
the action. This is bad news for Dancy since it questions the usefulness of
his distinction between favourers and enablers in order to find out what
really favours an action and what counts as a reason. Interestingly, Dancy
does not discuss this central problem at a general level; rather, he takes the
identity of reasons and favourers like (1) as given:
“That I promised to do it is (in this context at least) a reason
in favour of doing it. I am not going to argue for this; it is an
assumption of the example”22
As we have just seen, this assumption is far from being uncontroversial.
To make the issue still unclearer, Dancy himself is not consistent in his use
of these concepts. In an example in support of the claim that a favourer
20See as well Raz (2006), 105.
21See the next quote in the main text.
22Dancy (2004), 39.
90
alone is identical with the reason,23 he admits that in order for the reason to
exist, certain enablers must be in place.
“[T]hat someone is asking you the time is a reason to tell them, a
reason that would not exist if their purpose were to distract you
so that their accomplice can steal your bag. I would not be very
tempted to say that the reason is really that they are asking you
the time for a genuine rather than a surreptitious purpose.”24
If this is the case, then the reason alone does not favour, since it depends
on certain enablers. It could be the case that there is a reason – somebody is
asking you for the time – but that since a disabler is present – they want to
distract you in order to steal your bag – the reason does not favour.25
The issue of whether a favourer favours alone or requires enablers
to favour forces Dancy into a dilemma: Either, reasons consist merely
in favourers but, as we have just seen, do not favour action unless the
appropriate enablers are present; this is something Dancy explicitly rejects.26
Or, reasons do favour, but also contain enablers. Neither horn can satisfy
Dancy since for holism to work, reason and context, i.e. favourer and
enabler, have to fulfil separate and distinct roles so that it is possible to
isolate those features which function as reasons.
23The illustration is introduced as “another example“ alongside the first example of the
promise that has not been given freely but still exercises some compunction. As this first
example was supposed to show that enablers are not part of what favours an action, and as
the second example has the aim of demonstrating that enablers are not part of what counts
as a reason, this supports the claim that for Dancy, favourers and reasons are coextensive.
24Dancy (2004), 40.
25Note that this is a charitable reading of Dancy. It could also be argued that his
formulation does not make much sense, since it says that the asking for the time alone is a
reason, but in the next sentence denies that this is a reason unless a further element, an
enabler is present. The more charitable interpretation takes into account that by “to be a
reason“, Dancy might in the in the second instance just mean “to favour“: “That someone
is asking you the time is a reason to tell them, but this would not favour doing it if their
purpose were to distract you so that their accomplice can steal your bag“.
26See Dancy (2004), 29.
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The problem can be traced to two sources. The first is that Dancy tries
to base holism on two mutually exclusive ideas. One idea is that some
features of a situation count as favourers that alone favour an action. This is
necessary in order to isolate some features, which, as discussed above, is
one presupposition on which Dancy’s formulation of holism in the theory
of reasons is built. The second idea is that the context of a situation must
also be able to contribute to what action is favoured. Otherwise, favourers
would always count in the same way, but to grant this would be to give up
opposition to atomism. Hence, the idea of enablers that have an impact
on favourers is the other presupposition of holism. The two ideas stand
however opposed to each other. The first tries to isolate favourers from
enablers, and the second attempts to account for the impact of enablers on
favourers.
7.4 A new definition of “favourer” and “reason”
The second source of Dancy’s problem is that there is no answer to the
question of what it exactly means to favour an action. He bypasses the
question by claiming that we “already have an implicit grip”27 on the
concepts of favourers and enablers, and that with the help of some examples,
we are able to understand the distinction.28 Dancy’s justification for this is
that favourers and enablers are “philosophically significant concepts one
cannot explicate”29 but unfortunately, he does not tell us what makes them
incapable of explanation.
27Dancy (2004), 38.
28Those who do not agree with Dancy’s distinction just need according to him to improve
their understanding of the examples. What might stand behind this peculiar methodology
– instead of convincing opponents by arguments, Dancy tries to “show“ what is the correct
understanding – is a conception of how (primarily ethical) disagreements are to be resolved
which has been presented in hisMoral Reasons, 63f. and has originally been introduced
into the discussion of particularism by John McDowell.
29Dancy (2004), 38.
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Away out of these issues that raise problems for Dancy’s formulation
of holism is to start at this point and clarify what “favourer” means. A
plausible suggestion of an explicit definition of what role a feature has to
play in order to count as a favourer is to say that the feature has to show that
there is some advantage in doing the action.30 There might be various ways
of answering the question “Why have you bought this book?” which all
explain the advantage of doing the action: “because the semester is starting
and I want to be well prepared” (to my mother who does not know any
details about courses, reading-lists etc.); “because it is on the reading-list for
the ethics-course and I need it for my preparations” (to a fellow student);
“because I am going to university” (to somebody on the street who is curious
why anybody should buy such a book). Although these are different ways
of suggesting that there is an advantage in buying the book, they all refer to
one and the same reason.31 The example demonstrates that what we quote
as a favourer can vary according to whom we address the justification.
Hence, which features are quoted as favourer is determined by epistemic
factors: it must respond to our worries and depends on our background
knowledge and our expectations.32 In this, a favourer is distinct from a
reason. Following Raz’ suggestion, a reason might be described as follows:
“[R]easons make the actions for which they are reasons eligible.
[. . . ] What then is required for an action to be eligible? One
suggestion is that it takes the presence of an evaluative feature
which is so related to the action as to endow it with value. A
30This idea (and the following distinction between a reason and a favourer) is borrowed
from Raz (2006), 108-110.
31More on the notion of a reason below.
32How are enablers to be defined here? They might be understood as those features who
cannot be quoted as an explanation of why a feature favours an action – that an action
was not executed under duress like condition (2) in Dancy’s original example can itself
not be quoted as an explanation of why an action should be favoured – but which are
presupposed by the favourer: If “premise“ (2) had not been in place, it would be wrong to
quote (1) as a favourer in order to justify (5).
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reason is roughly the presence of an evaluative feature and of
the facts which connect it to the action in the right way (i.e. those
which show that the action has it, will preserve it or will bring it
about, or stop to damage it, etc.).”33
What does the reason consist of in the book-example? We need an
evaluative feature and an explanation of how it is related to the action. The
evaluative feature might be something like the aim of being a well-educated
person, and since in order to achieve this aim, it helps to be suitably
equipped, there is a link to the buying of the book. But the list of what is
part of the reason is not closed yet – in fact, it never can be. There might
be many features which could interrupt the link between the evaluative
feature and the action, and whose absence is required for the reason to be in
place – e.g. that I am blind and that therefore the book is useless for me,
that I have mistakenly picked up the wrong course-description etc. – or
there are other events or features which must be in place in order for the
link to be established – that the professor has spelled the titles correctly on
the course-handout, that I am indeed a student at this university etc. There
seems to be no stopping point behind which no further enablers or the
absence of disablers could be added any more since there are always further
possible circumstances which have not yet been taken into account. This
does however not mean that everything can be part of the reason. Unrelated
facts, i.e. those facts not concerning the link between the evaluative feature
and the action, are by definition excluded.34 Importantly, what is part of
the reason does not follow our epistemic needs. As the list of features
that have to be mentioned as part of the reason is open, its description
is never complete. Instead of being epistemic, the concept of a reason is
33Raz (2006), 109.
34Raz (2006), 109: “For example, none of the following is part of that reason: unrelated
evaluative features which constitute other independent reasons; the presence of features
which are reasons against the action; features which while consistent with the reason
having existed establish that it exists no longer, for one of its vital elements is no longer
present (e.g., some promises lapse once the promisee dies).“
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metaphysical: the question it addresses is what a complete reason consists
of. The concept of favourers offers an answer to a different question: Which
reason speaks in favour of the action? The answer does not need to entail a
complete list of all features that are part of the reason in order to successfully
refer to it. It just points out one feature which helps to identify the reason.
When answering in the book-example “I have bought the book because
I am going to university”, nobody would suppose that I have given a
complete description, but everybody who is informed about my context
knows which reason I am referring to.35 It is in this sense that a favourer
shows that there is some advantage in doing the action. Therefore, it would
not be appropriate to respond “Yes, but your professor might have given
you the wrong course-description, and you have not mentioned this in
your answer and therefore I cannot take what you have said to illuminate
why this favours the buying of the book”, because the favourer is “backed
up” by a reason that entails all enablers and the absence of disablers. To
think otherwise would be to confuse the concept of a reason with that of a
favourer.36
How do favourers relate to reasons? Since they are answering different
questions, it cannot be that a reason consists in a favourer – the latter is just
an epistemic reference to the former.37
35Somebody ignorant about this context, for example a Martian, would not be able
to interfere from this favourer the reason I am referring to. Instead, he would require a
different favourer, e.g. “I need this for my education.“
36To illustrate this point, imagine the answer: “You are right, but I presupposed that
nothing like this has happened. I just wanted to show you my reasons for buying the book,
and not to exclude all strange kinds of things which have not happened“.
37It is interesting to notice that the relation between favourers and reasons turns out to
be similar to the relation between resultance and supervenience as discussed in Chapter
2: resultance is serving an epistemic purpose and cannot used to establish principles
because of the influence of context, and supervenience is too complex to serve as a basis for
principles. Note however that the supervenience base contains all features of a situation,
but reasons do not contain some of the features of the supervenience base as discussed
above in the text.
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7.5 Holism of reasons versus holism of favourers
This has a direct bearing on the initial question whether holism can be used
to establish particularism as an epistemic or ametaphysical theory. (H) takes
features that are reasons to behave holistically.38 This presupposes however
that a single, isolated feature can be identical to a complete reason. If this
were true, then holism in the theory of reasons would be a metaphysical
theory of how features form reasons. As holism implies particularism, the
latter could as well be claimed to be a metaphysical theory, giving a negative
answer to the question whether what makes an action right follows lawlike
generalizations that form principles: the same feature that functions as a
reason in one case might form a reason that counts in the reverse direction
compared to the first one in another case or it might even form no reason at
all. Therefore, principles do not exist and the possibility of moral thought
and judgement cannot depend on them. But as discussed below, the identity
of isolable features with reasons is a dubious claim. Addressing the initial
question, this means that on the metaphysical level, there is no holism in the
theory of reasons and consequently no particularism.
The other option is to reformulate holism for features that are favourers
instead of reasons. Features that play the role of a favourer are, as we have
seen, isolable. That I go to university can be an isolated feature that plays
the role of a favourer, referring to a reason which cannot be pinned down to
a single feature. Furthermore, this feature behaves holistically: Sometimes,
the fact that I go to university counts against buying this specific book, e.g.
because it is available in the library; and sometimes, the fact that I go to
university is no reason at all. Favourers behave holistically because the
same favourer can refer in different contexts to different reasons. Hence,
holism should be reformulated as follows:
38In (H) it is implied that an isolable feature can be a reason: “a feature that is a reason
in one case. . . “
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(Hf): A feature that is a favourer in one case may be no favourer
at all, or an opposite favourer, in another.
As the concept of a favourer is epistemic, the holism that is built
on it is epistemic as well; it says something about how our explanations
of reasons rely on features that may in different circumstances count
in different ways.39 The particularism that follows from this holism is
epistemic as well: in our moral thought and judgement, we do not rely
on moral principles because the features we use in order to refer to moral
reasons behave holistically. What does this mean for particularism as
a metaphysical theory? Particularism as a metaphysical claim entails
epistemic particularism: if no principles exist, the question whether we rely
on them in our moral judgement has to be answered negatively as well.
If however epistemical particularism is true, this does not automatically
entail metaphysical particularism: it is conceivable that we do not rely
on principles in our moral judgement although they exist. It might, for
example, be the case that at the level of reasons, a very complex form of
utilitarianism is true – a form that spells fully out how to measure different
forms happiness and how to weigh different forms of happiness against
each other. So, if all conditions of this extremely long and complex list
of features that takes into account all possible enablers and favourers are
fulfilled, the action might always count in favour of doing what a certain
very complex principle demands. This invariability would not have to be
compatible with holism since there is no holism at the level of reasons.40
39“Explanation of a reason“ means here that it is explained which reason counts in
favour of the action, and not that all elements that are part of the reason are listed. When
asking “Can you explain to me why you have bought the book“, you usually do not expect
an answer like “I want to be a well-educated person; therefore I go to university; my
course-description requires that I buy this book; unless I am blind; the professor has quit
etc. I have therefore a reason to buy it“ but only “It was on my course-handout“.
40However, such a principle could not be action-guiding as Dancy requires it; but,
as discussed above, his conditions for principles are anyway difficult to reconcile, and
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7.6 Conclusion
To summarize, particularism as Dancy conceives it is both a metaphysical
and an epistemic theory: principles do not exist and our moral judgement
does not rely on them. The conclusiveness of this theory depends however
on a conception of holism as a claim about how moral reasons behave. The
formulation of holism presupposes that reasons are isolable features. As it
turns out, this conception of reasons is wrong: a complete formulation of a
reason entails besides favourers other features like the presence of enablers
and the absence of disablers. Reasons are not identical with favourers, but
consist of an evaluative feature and features that link it with the action.
Therefore, reasons are not isolable and do not behave holistically. However,
favourers can be isolated and serve as a base for holism, but this new holism
is weaker than in the original conception. It is silent about whether moral
principles exist or not; it merely establishes that in our moral thought and
judgement, we cannot rely on principles since the features we use to identify
reasons might in a different contexts refer to other reasons. So, in answer to
the initial question, particularism does not tell us whether moral principles
exist or not, but only that moral thought and judgement do not depend on
them.
therefore it is not a problem of the present case if not all conditions for principles can be




8.1 Particularism and ethical concepts
Aswe have seen at the end of Chapter 6.3., generalizations play an important
role for our moral judgements. If particularism wants to remain close to
moral phenomenology, it has therefore to allow for some kind of general-
ization. Strong moral particularism, the most plausible formulation of the
theory, is, as discussed above, committed to reconcile both particularism
and generalizations. The challenge is to make space for the requirements of
our moral phenomenology while at the same time remaining loyal to the
achievements of particularism.
In their articleUnprincipled Ethics, DavidMcNaughton and Piers Rawling
try to pursue such a project. The basic idea is that moral particularism is a
theory which concerns only the relation between non-moral properties – e.g.
the causing of pain, the distribution of wealth etc. – and ethical concepts –
e.g. that an act lacks gratitude, is beneficent or wrong.1 Particularism, so
McNaughton and Rawling’s claim, does however not extend to the relation
between the various ethical concepts. These can be divided into thin and
thick ethical concepts, where thick ethical concepts like cruelty, justice or
1The distinction between thin and thick ethical properties has been introduced by
Williams (1985), 129f.; 140-144.
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fidelity are defined by non-moral and evaluative features, while thin ethical
concepts like good, bad, right and wrong contain no non-moral elements.
The relations between thick and thin ethical concepts are structured in a
principled way;2 thick ethical concepts posses a counterfactually invariant
valence – e.g. to be just counts always for the good, while maleficence to
others makes an action always worse. These thick ethical concepts count
therefore always in favour of the same thin ethical properties.
8.2 Thick ethical concepts as prima facie duties
McNaugthon and Rawling’s theory takes as a model a certain interpretation
of Ross’s theory of prima facie duties. What is crucial in their way of
viewing Ross is that these prima facie duties consist of thick ethical concepts.
Prima facie duties can be summarized into six categories:
1. “Duties resting on a previous act of my own. These in turn
divide into two main categories
(a) Duties of fidelity; these result from my having made a
promise or something like a promise;
(b) Duties of reparation; these stem from my having done
something wrong so that I am now required to make
amends.
2. Duties resting on previous acts of others; these are duties
of gratitude, which I owe to those who have helped me.
3. Duties to prevent (or overturn) a distribution of benefits
and burdens which is not in accordance with the merit of
the persons concerned; these are duties of justice.
2The list of thick ethical concepts that relate in a principled way to thin ethical concepts
is however limited to prima facie reasons; see above.
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4. Duties which rest on the fact that there are other people in
the world whose condition we could make better; these are
duties of beneficence.
5. Duties which rest on the fact that I could better myself;
these are duties of self-improvement.
6. Duties of not injuring others; these are duties of non-
maleficence.“3
Prima facie duties are “morally fundamental“;4 the list is supposed to
contain no duties that can be derived from more basic ones. For example,
the duty not to lie is not part of the list because it stems from two more
elemental duties: those of non-maleficence and of fidelity. Normally,
somebody who lies may injure the person betrayed; furthermore, he breaks
a mutual promise to tell the truth which is an implicit presupposition of
communication. Violation of these fundamental duties is what makes lying
wrong. There might however be cases where lying is not considered as the
violation of a moral duty since none of the prima facie duties it is normally
linked to is at stake:5 no mutual agreement is in place when talking to
a compulsive liar, or when playing together a game whose aim it is to
lie successfully.6 In such a game, nobody is harmed, and nothing speaks
against pursuing such an activity. Generally spoken, the link between lying
and the prima facie duties of non-maleficence and fidelity is contingent.
In general, the link between thick ethical concepts which are not on the
list of prima facie duties and thin ethical concepts is contingent as well,
because they are not basic and can, depending on the situation, be reduced
in several ways to basic thick ethical concepts, i.e. to the those thick ethical
concepts that are part of the list of prima facie reasons. Generosity for
example usually counts in favour of an act because it can be reduced to
3McNaughton (2002), 79.
4McNaugthon (2002), 82.
5See McNaughton (2002), 80f.
6See Dancy (1993), 60f.
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the prima facie duties of beneficence and non-maleficence. If somebody is
however generous to an extremist group, this instance of benevolence can
be reduced to beneficence and to the violation of non-maleficence; here,
generosity counts against the action.7 This is however not the case for the
link between prima facie duties and thin ethical properties since prima facie
duties cannot be further reduced, and whether they speak against or in
favour of an action does not depend on further factors. If an act violates a
certain prima facie duty, this counts always against the action.8 Hence, the
link between a prima facie duty and a thin ethical concept is not contingent.
This is the thought behind James Urmson’s distinction between primary
and secondary reasons:
“Some fact will be a primary reason for acting in a certain way
if that fact’s obtaining is always a reason for acting that way,
though not necessarily a sufficient reason. Some fact will be
a secondary reason for acting in a certain way if that fact’s
obtaining brings about some fact which is a primary reason for
acting in that way.”9
McNaughton and Rawling take this definition to grasp the core of their
theory which they label as “thick intuitionism” and which holds that all
prima facie duties are primary reasons in Urmson’s sense (i.e., invariant),
while all other moral reasons that are neither prima facie duties nor consist
in a thin ethical concept are secondary reasons; examples for secondary
reasons include that the act is an instance of lying, that the act would cause
pain to somebody etc.10 Thick intuitionism is opposed to “thin intuitionism”
which is defended by Dancy who holds together with thick intuitionism
7A detailed account of the relation between those thick ethical concepts that are not on
the list of prima facie duties and those that are cannot be given here. McNaughton (2002)
tries to explicate the relation.
8This is not to say that it is necessarily wrong to pursue the act, but merely that the
prima facie duty is one factor which counts against doing it.
9Urmson (1975), 112.
10See McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 259 and 266f.
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that there is “an irreducible multiplicity of morally relevant considerations”,
but rejects the thick intuitionist’s claim that there is an invariant core of
thick ethical concepts.11
8.3 Thick intuitionism and holism
Now, McNaughton and Rawling’s thick intuitionism must defend its core
claim, the invariance of thick ethical concepts, against the particularist’s
master argument against invariance, holism in the theory of reasons.
Rather quickly, McNaughton and Rawling conclude that all holism is
able to show is the variance of those reasons quoted in the examples used
to establish holism itself. Otherwise, it is “powerless” in its attempt to
show that no primary reasons exist.12 But their attempt to reject the force of
holism can be questioned from two sides: as we have seen in the discussion
of Dancy’s attempt to show that invariant reasons are compatible with weak
particularism in Chapter 6.2.1., holism cannot be so easily dismissed. The
result of the discussion was that holism shows that potentially every feature
might turn out to have a varying impact on whether an act is ethically
permissible or not; therefore, there can be no principles that rely on an
invariant ethical valence of a certain feature. The reason for this is that
unpredictable situations might occur in which the context of the situation
affects the feature in question. Hence, it might be argued that holism is
stronger than supposed by McNaughton and Rawling. On the other hand,
11McNaughton andRawling (2000), 261. WhetherDancy regards himself as an intuitionist
is not clear. InMoral Reasons, he sees his theory as a “successor to the intuitionistic tradition“
(ix).
12McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 267. “Particularists hope to establish holism by
appeal to particular examples. But what these examples establish is only that there are
many considerations whose valence can and does change with context. [. . . ] It is hard to
see, however, how appeal to a few examples can establish that there are no considerations
with unvarying valence. If one holds to the distinction between primary and secondary
reasons then any convincing example of a switch in valence will merely be taken to show
that the consideration in the examples are not primary reasons.“
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it would be problematic for them if holism was as weak as they argue since
then, the whole enterprise of particularism would be questioned. Only
the reasons used in the examples to introduce holism would for sure be
holistic, leaving open how all other reasons behave. The challenge would
then not be to argue that some form of principles exist within particularism,
but the other way around: do reasons in general behave holistically, and
can it still be argued that therefore, principles are not possible? The risk
would be to narrow down the impact of holism so much in order to allow
for some principles within particularism that it becomes difficult to defend
particularism itself. As McNaughton and Rawling accept particularism
for the relation between non-moral and moral reasons, this would be a
problematic result for them. If thick intuitionists want to defend that
thick ethical concepts behave invariantly and be at the same time moral
particularists, they must find a better response to the challenge of holism.
Given this lack of convincing arguments in McNaughton and Rawling’s
theory, it is easy for Dancy to defend the contrary position in explicit
opposition to thick intuitionism:
“My own view is that almost all the standard thick concepts,
such as integrity, fidelity, gratitude, reparation, and so on, are of
variant valence.”13
His critique is not only that McNaughton and Rawling do not produce
any argument in favour of their position, but as well that most prima facie
duties turn out not to be invariant. There is, for instance, not always a
prima facie duty to keep promises if what I have promised turns out to
be deeply immoral. Sometimes, there might as well be no prima facie
reason to pay a reparation for an unjust harm done, and the same goes for
fidelity and gratitude and most other prima facie duties apart from justice.
Unfortunately, Dancy does not supply his claims with concrete examples
and it seems, contrary to what he proposes, difficult to imagine cases where
13Dancy (1994), 121.
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there is not even a prima facie duty to make a reparation for an unjust
harm. The fact that it is hard to imagine a feature as variant is however
not, as discussed in Chapter 6.2.1.2., a reason in favour of its invariance. I
take Dancy’s criticism therefore to be that McNaughton and Rawling lack a
positive argument in favour of the invariance of prima facie duties.
Is there a defence for thick intuitionism? First of all, to show that some
elements on the list of prima facie duties are variant is not enough to refute
McNaughton and Rawling’s claim which is intended to defend a general
claim about how prima facie reasons behave and not about single elements
of the list; if necessary, the list could simply be corrected.14 This does
however not address the basic problem (and besides, it sounds to weak
since Dancy tries to show that almost all prima facie duties are variant): Why
should we believe in the first place that prima facie duties are invariant? If
holism in the theory of reason implies that all features we use to refer to
reasons behave according to context, why should we suppose that this is
not the case with thick ethical features?15 The key is to argue that holism
extends only over non-moral, and not over evaluative features. To see
how this idea works, it is helpful to consider one immediate benefit of the
conception of prima facie reasons as thick ethical concepts, which is that it
can be used as a rejoinder against Dancy’s argument against the invariance
of various prima facie duties. Promise-keeping, he complained, does not
always count in favour of an action. The thick intuitionist might reply that
since promise-keeping as a thick ethical concept cannot be spelled out in
purely non-moral terms, it might be part of the concept of promise-keeping
that it is impossible to promise deeply immoral acts:
“Since promising is an institution for placing oneself under a
moral obligation to perform an act, there would be clearly be
something self-defeating in allowing that one could use the
14McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 268.
15McNaughton and Rawling clearly recognize the force of this attack; see their (2000),
263.
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institution to place oneself under a moral obligation to do an
immoral act – an act that one had a moral obligation not to do.”16
Similar points can be made about other prima facie duties, and Mc-
Naughton and Rawling try to show at length that all items on Ross’s list
entail normative elements so that they must always count in the same
direction. To quote two further cases they discuss: the concept of justice
depends on the normative notion of merit, and the concept of fidelity
presupposes that the promise has not been extracted under duress. Where
these normative elements – merit, the absence of duress, or whatever is part
of the specific prima facie duty – are not in place, the situation cannot be an
instance of this prima facie duty.17
What these examples of thick ethical concepts have in common is that
the evaluative content that is part of their definition establishes a necessary
link between the prima facie duty and a thin ethical concept. It always and
necessarily counts in favour of an action if it is the fulfilment of a promise,
since it is part of the concept of fulfilling a promise to have a positive ethical
valence. The evaluative part of the concept “blocks” all situations whose
context would stop the promise from counting in favour of the action –
e.g. if the promise would commit to a deeply immoral act. It is part of the
understanding of the concept of promising that it always counts for the
right.18 It is analytically false that I promised to do x if x is deeply morally
wrong. This entitles thick intuitionism to a response against the charge
that due to holism, there can be no invariance. Evaluative features are
able to limit the kind of situations in which the thick ethical concept occurs:
contexts that reverse its valence are excluded by definition. Hence, holism
has no power over thick ethical concepts and invariance is possible.
16McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 270.
17See McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 269f.
18McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 266 argue with the example of justice, but the
same goes for promise-keeping as well: “Justice is a moral concept, and we suggest
that understanding it, qua supervening term, requires an apprehension of its essential
connection to the right.“
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Unfortunately, McNaughton and Rawling fail to clarify the impact of
thick concepts and their evaluative features on the argument of holism
against principles. Although it is implicit in their discussion, the argument
just presented is not spelled out in their article, and this might be the reason
why Dancy complained about the lack of a proper argument in favour of
the invariance of prima facie reasons.
In his attempt to establish invariant reasons within weak particularism,
Dancy argued earlier on in Chapter 6.2.1. that some reasons behave in such
a way because of their content, e.g. that causing pain to those who have not
consented to it counts always against an action. I have tried to show that
content understood in non-moral terms is not able to fulfil this function.
Thick intuitionism argues differently from weak particularism: it is the
kind of content of the concept of promise-keeping that makes thick ethical
concepts invariant. Evaluative, in contrast to non-moral features, are such
that they link the concepts they are part of to a thin ethical concept. While
Dancy tried to argue that the concrete content of a reason is what makes it
invariant – e.g. because it consists in the causing of pain to somebody who
has not consented to it – and not the “logic of reasons”, i.e. how reasons
behave in general, the thick intuitionist goes the other way around: moral
reasons involving thick ethical terms behave in general such that their thick
ethical component links the prima facie reason necessarily and always in
the same way to a thin ethical concept and this makes it invariant. Here, the
kind of the content of the reason, namely the fact that the prima facie reason
consists of non-evaluative and of thick ethical concepts is responsible for
the invariance.
8.4 Is thick intuitionism a trivial theory?
Margaret Little agrees that thick ethical features are univalent while non-
moral ones are not, but she thinks that this is no significant achievement:
“Thick moral features differ from non-moral ones precisely
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because, so identified, they are guaranteed of carrying a given
valence of moral significance (part of what it is to count as a
moral feature, to earn the status as a moral feature so identified,
is to count as a moral reason of a given direction). [. . . ] In the
end, the most one can say is that, in contexts in which a feature
is good-making, it is good making – not exactly late-breaking
news.”19
Little is right in claiming that thick ethical principles do not tell us which
non-moral features always count in which way. Rather, the use of thick
ethical concepts presupposes the ability to judge which non-moral features
instantiate which prima facie duties. Prima facie duties understood as thick
ethical concepts could not serve the purpose of justifying an act towards
somebody who is unfamiliar with the concept itself. As Dancy puts it,
moral concepts are “shapeless” in regard to the non-moral properties they
supervene upon, which means that while non-moral properties are the
subvenient base of the moral concepts, the latter cannot be reduced to the
former because the non-moral features cannot explain when the moral
concept applies.20
Hence, the thick intuitionist’s principles are unable to give any principles
for the relation between non-moral and moral concepts – that would in
the context of particularism indeed be late-breaking news. Rather, the
thick intuitionist’s principles state that when we use generalizations, these
generalizations behave like principles in an invariant fashion because it
is part of their meaning to behave this way. The news is that thick ethical
19Little (2000), 288f.
20In his (1993), 79, Dancy quotes with approval McDowell, when he makes a similar
point about moral terms which supervene upon non-moral features: “however long a
list we give of the items to which a supervening term applies, described in terms of the
level supervened upon, there might be no way, expressible at the level supervened upon,
of grouping just such items together (. . . ) Understanding why just those things belong
together may essentially require understanding the supervening term“. See McDowell
(1981), 145.
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concepts are such that they contain invariance. This does however not mean
– as Little argues – that it is not significant if thick ethical concepts behave
invariantly. Rather, they play an important role in moral justification.
8.5 Conclusion
If McNaughton and Rawling were right, this would draw a different picture
ofmorality compared toDancy. It is important to stress here that thick ethical
concepts are no odd invention of moral philosophers, but play a crucial
role in our moral deliberation. Morality would not be possible without
them since an essential part of moral deliberation is based upon principles,
namely thick ethical concepts that “correspond to the traditional virtues and
vices”21 Hence, how thick ethical concepts behave is an important question
not only for the moral particularist.
In Dancy’s theory, only thin ethical concepts are per definition invariant,
but the rest is not ordered in any law-like structure – although there might
be some generalizations which fall however short of providing principles.
Since thick intuitionism explicitly allows that there is no lawlike relation
or principles between non-moral and moral concepts, particularists should
be happy to accept thick intuitionism. After all, it is the particularist’s
intention to come close to everydaymoral practice,22 and it sounds plausible
to claim that we take it for granted in our deliberation that e.g. the fact that
an action is just always and automatically counts in favour of it. On the other
hand, if thick intuitionism is compatible with particularism, this makes it
harder for particularism to claim to be a radical theory. If many aspects of
our everyday moral practice are in line with particularism, even the fact
that we often use some sort of principle in our moral deliberation, why
should we suppose that Dancy succeeds with his claim that particularism
21McNaughton and Rawling (2000), 273.
22This is so at least in case of the strong and weak formulation of particularism; extreme
particularism is to my knowledge not defended anymore by anybody, and it can be
interpreted as an exaggerated reaction against principled ethics.
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has the purpose “of changing the ways in which we think about what to do,





9.1 Is particularism true?
What is ethical particularism, is it true and is it a threat to traditional moral
theory?
This was the leading question introduced in Chapter 1. By now, we
should be able to give an answer to it.
In the introduction, I have identified three main steps in Dancy’s
argument. To recall them, let’s quote the steps again:
1. The distinction between favourers and enablers. Favourers are those
features that count for doing an action. Reasons are identical with
favourers. Enablers are those features of the context which have
to be in place in order for the favourer/reason to work. Disablers
stop a favourer/reason from working. Enablers and disablers are not
themselves part of the reason.
2. Holism in the theory of reasons. The context of a situation determines
whether a feature counts in favour or against an action or whether it
plays no role in determining its right- or wrongness, as stated in (1).
Therefore, no feature can be said to have an invariant ethical valence.
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3. Moral Particularism. Principles of the form “if x, then y”, where x is a
non-moral feature and y a moral predicate, presuppose that feature
x invariantly counts in the same direction. Since holism as stated in
(2) shows that it cannot be excluded that x is changed in its ethical
valence by context, neither moral principles exist nor should we in
our moral thought and judgement rely on them.
Given this way of structuring the argument, (1) implies (2), and (2)
implies (3).
Concerning (1), it has been shown in Chapter 7 that this conception
of favourers, enablers and reasons is untenable. The role of favourers
and enablers cannot be separated as easily as suggested by Dancy, and
in consequence, reasons have to be understood in a different way. This
has a direct impact on the question of whether (1) implies (2): if Dancy’s
conception of favourers and enablers is wrong, his notion of holism that is
supposed to be a consequence of this conception cannot be right. The way
out for the particularist is to stick to a different definition of the basic terms
introduced in (1) and to change holism accordingly. In this new argument,
favourers are not identical with reasons, but are only used to refer to them.
Reasons contain also enablers and are much larger than in Dancy’s version
of (1). Therefore, we are unable to quote them completely. Here, we cannot
any more formulate holism in the theory of reasons because this requires
that we identify a single feature as the reason. This is however possible for
favourers. The outcome is that we can formulate holism only for favourers,
and not for reasons. Not surprisingly, this has consequences for the step
from (2) to (3): particularism relies on holism, and since holism of reasons
is dead, there is no particularism about reasons, or, as I understand it, on
a metaphysical level answering the question whether principles exist or
not. In contrast, holism of favourers allows maintaining particularism
for our moral epistemology where the question is whether favourers, i.e.
those features that we quote in order to refer to a reason, can be put into
principles.
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Back to (2), another issue concerning holism is whether it does, as Dancy
claims, exclude principles. Some philosophers like McKeever and Ridge
have tried to show that holism is perfectly compatible with principles and
that it can therefore not count as an argument in favour of particularism. In
Chapter 4, I discuss this challenge against particularism, and with a better
formulation of holism that takes into account Dancy’s original intention
when formulation the claim, I am able to refute their argument. This allows
the particularist to hold that holism, (2), implies particularism, (3). Two
other issues with particularism concern (3), the formulation of particularism.
The first problem is how to define principles. It turns out that Dancy
has such a strong view on what counts as a principle – principles must, as
we have seen in Chapter 5, explain the moral status of every action, explain
why the action has the status and be able to guide the agent, to quote only
three of the conditions – that it might just be replied by his adversaries that
a principled ethical system is possible as long as it is not insisted that all
of these conditions have to be fulfilled. The first and the third conditions
for principles quoted here stand even in tension: principles that are so
fine-grained that they apply to all possible cases might be too complicated
to serve the guiding-function.
The second issue, discussed in Chapter 6, turns on the exact under-
standing of what particularism is. Dancy progresses over time in his
thoughts about his theory, and there is reason to doubt that his last version
of particularism is the best. Not only does he try on shaky grounds to
introduce invariant reasons within particularism, but his very formulation
of the theory also fails to address the problem it is supposed to solve, namely
the attack on holism from McKeever and Ridge discussed in Chapter 4. But
since I disagree with their argument for other reasons, even the original
motivation for the last version of Dancy’s theory ceases to apply and it
is more attractive to prefer an older, stronger version of particularism.
It must however be noted that this is only the case when accepting the
grounds upon which Dancy builds his theory, holism. Since earlier on in
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the discussion of (1), I rejected these grounds, all that the discussion in
Chapter 6 does is to see what formulation of particularism is the internally
most coherent one for Dancy – Chapter 7 questions, as discussed above,
the whole enterprise of holism of reasons and comes to a different result
about the force of particularism. A last issue, discussed in Chapter 8,
deals with the question of whether it might not be possible to allow for
principles within particularism as long as they do not concern the relation
between non-moral and moral properties. I try to advance an argument
similar to McNaughton and Rawling that prima facie duties, understood as
thick ethical concepts, are invariant because of their evaluative component
that links them necessarily to a thin ethical property. Chapter 3 prepares
the ground for this move by arguing against Dancy that the definition
of prima facie duties is coherent. If prima facie duties are invariant and
form principles, this would be a step towards answering the last part of
the leading question, namely how serious the particularist challenge is for
traditional ethical theories. But before turning to this point, I shall consider
whether the first part of the leading question, what particularism is and
whether it is a tenable view, can been answered. To do this, it is helpful to
see whether the basic steps (1)-(3) in the particularist’s argument and their
relation as Dancy conceives it can be accepted in the light of the previous
discussions:
• (1), the distinction between favourers and enablers and aswell Dancy’s
conception of what counts as a reason has been rejected and replaced
by a different understanding of the terms. This new conception can
however still be used to ground a form of holism. Hence, a modified
version of (1) is defensible and implies some form of (2), holism.
• (2), holism of reasons, has been replaced by holism of favourers.
Insofar as this is still enough to ground a (weaker) version of (3),
particularism, the particularist should be happy with this. In fact,
(2) implies, contrary to what some philosophers argue, (3). Hence,
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a modified version of (2) is defensible and implies some form of (3),
particularism.
• (3), moral particularism, must be understood as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. It should allow for some form of ethical
generalizations. The concept of principles Dancy’s particularism relies
on is however problematic and too narrow. Nevertheless, (3), the
main claim that moral thought and judgement should not rely on
principles, is defensible.
9.2 Particularism and traditional ethical theories
Once this is established, the question of how serious particularism is
becomes pressing. Has Dancy revealed that an important presupposition of
traditional moral theory is wrong? A detailed answer to this questionwould
require an analysis of the various normative ethical systems put forward in
the history of philosophy – utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, contractualism
and virtue ethics – and to ask how they deal with principles: do they use
ethical generalizations in such a way that they fulfil the conditions Dancy
require for principles? If yes, does the role they attribute to principles
conflict with holism? Such a project is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
but I will hint at an answer by pointing out three results of the previous
discussions:
1. Dancy’s requirements for counting as a principle are so strong that
those defending a traditional ethical system might simply reply
that their notion of principle is weaker and therefore bypasses the
particularist’s attack. For example, they might deny that principles
have to explain the status of every action.
2. Since holism is only defensible for favourers and consequently, partic-
ularism holds only at an epistemic level, it is still possible that very
complex principles exist that do not play a role in our moral thought
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and judgement. For example, a utilitarian could argue that although
a very long-winded utilitarian principle is true, we do better to stick
to our learned rules of behaviour in order to maximize happiness.
3. There are plenty of principles we can use inmoral deliberationwithout
violating particularism. The only condition is, as shown in Chapter 8,
that these principles contain only thick and thin ethical concepts.
These limitations of particularism show that there are resources for
traditional moral theories to work with principles. This gives raise to the
suspicion that particularism might be less radical than it appears at first
sight.
9.3 The bottom line
The title of Dancy’s last book, “Ethics without principles”, looks like the
header of an intimidating theory for all traditional ethical theories. If true,
one might think, a lot of ethical theorising has to be re-written. If considered
in detail, the conclusion looks however not as far-reaching: particularism
– taking into account the reformulations discussed above – seems to be
true, but not nearly as important as intended by Dancy. Traditional moral
theorists should be able to accommodate the insight of particularism that
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